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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
If you pick up a newspaper, watch a political network, or engage in a conversation 
with a coworker you are likely to come upon the topic of threats to America. Is North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program an existential threat to the United States? How does 
climate change effect our national security? These questions are topical and are 
highlighted in the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS identifies multiple 
threats including “catastrophic attacks against the U.S. homeland, attacks against our 
allies, economic crises, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), infectious 
diseases, climate change, energy disruption, and weak states.”1 Furthermore, the NSS 
notes the following actors: China, Russia, North Korea, ISIS, and Al Qaida as existential 
threat to the United States. 2  The 2017 NSS included the Iranian regime, and all 
previously mentioned actors in the 2015 NSS as existential threats to the United States.3 
Concurring with the NSS, multiple scholars have written extensively on how these actors 
threaten the United States led international order and the continental United States.4  
 Along with the threats currently listed new threats arise over time. These threats 
can be a result of a large build up over time (ISIS) or via a sudden break down in 
                                                        
1 The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.: NSS, February 2015, p. 2 
<http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf>. 
2 The White House, National Security Strategy, p. 7-11. 
3 The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.: December 2017, p. II 
4 On Russia see: Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “NATO Commander: Russia Poses ‘Existential Threat’ 
to West”, RFE, February 25, 2016, <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-breedlove-russia-existential-
threat/27574037.html >, On North Korea see: Atlantic Council, “The ‘Existential Threat’ Posed by North 
Korea”, Atlantic Council, July 28. 2017 <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-
existential-threat-posed-by-north-korea>, Matthew Pennington, “North Korea poses ‘existential threat, US 
intel chief warns”, Military Times, May 11, 2017, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-
congress/2017/05/11/north-korea-poses-existential-threat-us-intel-chief-warns/>, On ISIS see: Frederick W. 
Kagan et al. “Al Qaeda and ISIS: Existential Threats to The U.S. and Europe”, Institute for the Study of 
War, 2016, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/PLANEX%20Report%201%20--
%20FINALFINALFINAL.pdf>. 
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governance that could lead to instability within a region (Venezuela). While there seems 
to be a hierarchical system of threat, usually marked by a tier level, any action could be 
construed as an existential or destabilizing threat. 5  The tier levels allow for the 
government to categorize threats, ranging from high priority to low priority. 6 
Additionally, a threat can emerge after a foreign actor engages with the United States. 
Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent war is one example of how a threat 
can emerge, Even if a country poses no immediate threat, the United States can claim 
that, in the future a state has an ability to pose a threat.7 If a country meets any of the 
listed criteria, the United States can use military force to meet its objective.8 In the past, 
the United States has used its military to fight threats and remove dictators that could 
pose further threats against the homeland.9 
 The NSS is clear, the United States can create a causal link between any 
international activity and the national security interest of the United States. This doctrine 
allows the United States to intervene in international affairs under the guise of securing a 
                                                        
5 The best current example of a threat being labeled a national security threat is Venezuela. In 2015 
President Obama deemed Venezuela a national security threat. Jeff Mason, Roberta Rampton, “U.S. 
declares Venezuela a national security threat, sanctions top officials”, Reuters, March 9, 2015, 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela/u-s-declares-venezuela-a-national-security-threat-
sanctions-top-officials-idUSKBN0M51NS20150310>, In 2017 President Trump solidified the threat and 
hinted at that he was considering using the military to end the social unrest. The New York Times, “Trump 
Alarms Venezuela With Talk of a Military Option”, The New York Times, August 12, 2017, 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/world/americas/trump-venezuela-military.htm>, Furthermore, think 
tanks have provided supplementary articles highlighting the threat of Venezuela Michaela Frai and Alex 
Entz, “Venezuela is on fire and US national security will get burned”, The Hill, July 15, 2017 
<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/342149-venezuela-is-on-fire-and-the-us-will-get-
burned>, Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should Be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority”, CSIS, August 17, 
2017 <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority>.   
6 An example of the tier scheme can be seen in: Paul B. Stevens, “Preventive Priorities Survey: 2014,” 
Council on Foreign Relations, December 13, 2013 <https://www.cfr.org/report/preventive-priorities-
survey-2014>. 
7 This doctrine is known as preemptive and preventive war. The distinction between the two doctrines is 
negligible.   
8 White House, National Security Strategy, p. 8. 
9 The United States launched a preventive war against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. This 
theme of military action will be discussed in Chapters 3 & 5. 
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national interest. The effectiveness and efficiency of this doctrine is widely debated in 
academic and policy forums.10 Debates on the United States grand strategy and its future 
role in the international order are essential. However, those debates should be secondary 
to the question of how a threat came is identified. Understanding how an actor becomes a 
threat is an a priori issue. If grand strategy is a finished jigsaw puzzle, then the 
identification of threats represents the corner pieces. The lack of a threat identification 
process, leads to foreign policy decisions not anchored to a framework and thus grand 
strategy fails.  Without fully understanding the threat identification policy process the 
debates related to national security remains incomplete.  
 If understanding how an actor becomes a threat is truly an a priori issue, then 
investigating the threat identification process should act as the starting point for academic 
research. Therefore, I will attempt to answer the following question, how does the United 
States identify threats? To answer that question there are many secondary questions that 
need to be posed. One question involves the bureaucratic nature, how are national 
security decisions made? Once a decision is made that a state threatens the United States 
national interest, what is the process for implementing a policy to counter the identified 
threat? To answer these questions I will investigate the George H. W. Bush and Clinton 
administration’s Iraq policy. In each case study I attempt to pinpoint the moment when 
Iraq or in the latter case Saddam Hussein, became a threat to the U.S. interest. After the 
                                                        
10 The two sides in laymen terms can be described as interventionist and isolationist. These two terms are 
over simplifications and use of these terms can cause serious misinterpretation of core principles within the 
two ideologies. Since this thesis primary focus is on threat construction and not on grand strategy those 
terms will be used. For an example of an interventionist point of view see: Charles Krauthammer, “The 
Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, 1990, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-
moment>, For an example of an isolationist point of view see: The Week Staff, “A brief history of 
Americans isolationism”, The Week, June 5, 2016, <http://theweek.com/articles/627638/brief-history-
american-isolationism>. 
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threat is identified, I then track the policy changes the United States made related to the 
identified threat.  
As I recreate the bureaucratic process, I try to identify whether a decision is made 
on an ad-hoc basis or in a manner consistent with a former U.S. policy. Ad-hoc policy is 
a sign of an ineffective grand strategy. By its very nature, ad-hoc decisions are made with 
a heavy focus on the short-term and fail to consider long term strategic goals. Grand 
strategy, defined as the means that are used to achieve long-term objectives, is 
incompatible with ad-hoc decision-making.11 Therefore, the lack of a threat identification 
process and the resulting policy actions made in an ad-hoc manner undermines a long-
term grand strategy approach. Consequently, a coherent and successful grand strategy 
depends on a uniform and institutionalized approach to threat identification. 
Explanation of Threats 
 One explanation for why there is always a threat to an international actor is the 
notion of a security dilemma.12 The security dilemma is rooted in the ideas of realism; 
each state is an individual rational actor in an anarchist society and each state vies to 
maintain its security.13 To become secure, a state must pursue means that gives it an 
advantage over the state it’s competing with. This lead to the pursuance of absolute 
security. However, the pursuit by one state to become absolutely secure will lead rival 
states to adopt means to balance that states power. Therefore, the security dilemma posits 
                                                        
11 Colin Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (New York 
City: Routledge, 2007) P. 283. 
12 For more on the security dilemma see: John H. Hertz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security 
Dilemma”, World Politics 2, no.2 (Jan., 1950) 157-180, Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security 
Dilemma”, World Politics 30, no. 2 (Jan., 1978): 167-214, & Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma 
Revisited”, World Politics 50, no. 1 (Oct., 1997): 171-201.  
13 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, Foreign Policy, no. 110 
(Spring, 1998) 29-32+34-46 
<http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/hpschmitz/PSC124/PSC124Readings/WaltOneWorldManyTheories.pdf>. 
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that warring factions are inevitable in the international system.14 If less powerful states 
are trying to maintain pace with more powerful states or in a multilateral system, multiple 
states are trying to become the global hegemon then threats and conflicts are intrinsic to 
the international system. As noted earlier the United States reports multiple threats on 
multiple continents as being security concerns. As other states catch up to the United 
States in terms of military strength and economic power the United States will face even 
more threats. 
Another realist theory, the balance of threats theory15, tries to provide an answer 
for why states engage in conflict. Stephen Walt’s balance of threats theory identifies four 
factors for why states engage in conflict; aggregate power, offensive capability, 
geographical proximity, and aggressive intentions.16 This theory helps intellectuals and 
policymakers understand why certain states engage in power struggles. The balance of 
threats and security dilemma can be used to frame the current and future thought process 
of the United States, threats are present, resilient, and persistent.  
However, neither of the theories discussed above, can be used as the primary tool 
to describe how threats are securitized, because they fail to identify how the threat 
identification policy process works. In the abstract, the theories assume that states actions 
are rational, and therefore any action taken by a state is in the pursuit of its vested 
interest. However, state actions made ad-hocly are not always rational, and therefore the 
precondition of the security dilemma and balance of threats theory is not met. One 
                                                        
14 John H. Hertz, 157 
15 For more on the balance of threats theory see: Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and Balance of 
Power”, International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring, 1985) 3-43 
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2538540.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:5c18e0d0d9d238fac2b112dae423e6d7>. 
16 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Press 1987).  
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example of this disconnect between theory and policy is the United States invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. In 2002, a group of realist scholars wrote an ad for the New York Times 
that said, “War With Iraq is NOT In America’s National Interest.”17 Despite the scholar’s 
pleas, the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The realist theories cannot explain the U.S. 
threat identification of Iraq, and therefore a process needs to be developed on how the 
United States identifies threats.  
Currently there is not a theory that captures the security policy-making process. 
Likewise, the policy realm lacks institutional guidelines on how a state becomes an 
existential threat. Not being able to study the securitization process severely hampers 
policy makers and academics alike. The lack of institutional guidelines, leads to ad-hoc 
decision making, which has numerous drawbacks. First, ad-hoc decision making favors 
risk-seeking members over risk adverse members. This sentiment is capture by former 
Vice President Dick Cheney’s one-percent doctrine. The one-percent doctrine posits “if a 
threat has even a one percent chance of becoming a reality, it requires enormous 
resources to mitigate.”18  Furthermore, the United States past actions dictates that on 
matters related to foreign policy action is better than inaction.19 Second, an ad-hoc policy 
process is easier to manipulate. When a political actor adopts a policy preference then 
dissent becomes unacceptable. In the lead up to the 2003 Iraq war, institutional dissent 
fell on deaf ears. Intelligence agents, who questioned the President’s WMD narrative, the 
                                                        
17 33 International Relation Scholars, “War With Iraq is NOT In America’s National Interest,” New York 
Times, September 26, 2002 <http://www.bear-left.com/archive/2002/0926oped.html>. 
18 John Glaser, “Truth, Power, and the Academy: A Response to Hal Brands,” War on the Rocks, March 26, 
2018 <https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/truth-power-and-the-academy-a-response-to-hal-brands/>. 
19 Emma Ashford, “Trump’s Syria Strikes Show What’s Wrong With U.S. Foreign Policy,” New York 
Times, April 13, 2018 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/opinion/trump-us-foreign-policy.html>. 
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main justification for war, found that their concerns did not make the official report to 
Congress.20   
When an unknown non-state actor poses a threat in a particularly unstable region 
policy makers scramble to assign risk to that actor. During this scramble policy makers 
have to conduct an internal cost benefit analysis. What are the effects of dismissing the 
risk? What are the effects of making the risk hyperbolic? If a policy maker dismisses a 
risk and the risk ends up being a real and menacing threat to the United States then the 
policy maker and her institution’s credibility suffer. The agency might lose key influence 
with policy makers, or future reports by the agency could be viewed skeptically. On the 
other hand, if the agency oversells the risk of the actor and it turns out that the actor is 
benign, the agency is not punished. Therefore, within the national security institutions, 
individuals are incentivized to inflate risks.  
A review of America’s foreign policy found that threats are constantly 
overinflated. Policy makers, in particular, have an added pressure to inflate threats.21 The 
pressure to perform increases when the government fails to prevent an attack on the 
homeland. After 9/11, there was a serious discussion pertinent to the CIA’s ability to 
perform its duty. Another failure would have dictated more than a serious discussion, and 
would have likely led to institutional restructuring of the CIA. Institutional changes 
undermine the ability of an organization. Therefore, maintaining the organizational 
status-quo was the CIA’s top priority post 9/11. When it came time for the National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 2002 the CIA endorsed the President’s assessment, and the 
                                                        
20 These are just two examples from Glaser’s “Truth, Power, and the Academy” article. 
<https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/truth-power-and-the-academy-a-response-to-hal-brands/>. 
21 John Mueller, “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration,” 
International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005), p. 208-234 
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report was rife with risk inflation.22 As mentioned earlier, intelligence agents who voiced 
concerns about the report, where merely mentioned in passing.  
One agency that could demand that the threat identification policy process 
becomes more transparent is Congress. Under the Constitution the President is the 
commander in chief however he lacks the authority to declare war or fund the military.23 
A popularized argument within the Beltway is that Congress does not have to fund a 
President’s military adventure if it disagrees with the strategy or the involvement of 
United States troops. This statement while popular, is fallacious because Congress 
becomes the scapegoat once it gets involved on matters dealing with foreign policy.24 
Even when Congress and the President fundamentally disagree about an issue relating to 
foreign policy, the executive branch typically implements its preferred policy.25  
If Congress took a sudden interest in the threat identification policy process, they 
would still lack the means for reform. Congress relies on the executive branch for 
information and updates on U.S. strategic interests. The executive branch does not have a 
reciprocal reliance on Congress for issues dealing with foreign affairs. This one-way 
relationship undermines Congress’s ability to regulate and demand answers on the 
securitization process. Notwithstanding this one-way relationship, if Congress gained the 
ability to demand transparency over the process it has been noted that there is a lack of a 
                                                        
22 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II, (Vintage Books: New York, 2007) P. 146-
149 
23 While lacking the power to declare war the President still has the authority to engage in foreign actions. 
See: The War Powers Resolution  
24 As Chapter 3 will show, Congress can be put into predicaments where the deck is stacked against them, 
and they have to cede to the President’s preferred policy option. 
25 Daniel W. Drezner, “The polarization of American foreign policy turns out to not matter so much — for 
now”, The Washington Post, 09/08/2015 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/09/08/the-polarization-of-american-foreign-
policy-turns-out-to-not-matter-so-much-for-now/?utm_term=.ae721cd05375>.  
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process. Congress’s demand for a securitization process would deplete resources from 
policy makers and could undermine policymaker’s ability to react to emerging situations. 
The demand from Congress therefore would result in an undue burden for policy makers 
and could become a scapegoat for executive failures.  
 Academics can play a specialized role in the process, as they are removed from 
the initial situation, which prevents confirmation bias, but they are entrenched in a place 
of power where their scholarly work can influence current and future policy makers. 
Policymakers who were involved with the securitized event are likely to draw 
conclusions based on their personal experience and therefore cannot investigate the threat 
identification process. The academics do not have to create a new theory and can rely on 
the securitization framework introduced by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies.26  
The theory of securitization focuses on the threat identification process. A 
political actor, an audience, and a context make up the core components of the 
securitization model.27 The synergy of the three components leads to a securitization 
move, which is an escalation in policy related to an identified threat.28 Chapter two will 
further discuss the securitization theory and how this thesis plans on identifying a 
securitization move.  
  A primary concern with the securitization theory is that the theory is ex-post 
facto. Knowledge of the actor, the audience, and the context can only be acquired after 
                                                        
26 The Copenhagen theory of securitization is considered a radical constructivist theory. The theory of 
securitization was first introduced in the book Security: A New Framework for Analysis written by Barry 
Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Waever. In modern literature these authors are referred to as first wave 
securitization scholars. For more on the history of securitization: Holger Stritzel, “Securitization Theory 
and the Copenhagen School”, In: Security in Translation (London: Palgrave McMillian, 2014).   
27 Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Leonard, and Jan Ruzicka, “Securitization revisited: theory and cases”, 
International Relations 30(4) 2016: 495 
28 Rita Floyd, “Extraordinary or ordinary emergency measures: what, and who, defines the ‘success’ of 
securitization,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28(2) 2016, p. 679. 
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the fact. To dismiss a theory because it cannot offer a precursor hypothesis for an action 
is not a reason to dismiss the theory. The securitization process is a systematic review of 
an event through the lens of the three components. Learning more about each instance of 
securitization lead to the emergence of patterns these patterns will help scholars 
understand how a threat became a threat and what successful strategies were used by 
previous actors in securitizing the threat. Additionally, the diagnostic approach gives 
scholars an opportunity to offer reforms to the current process. Furthermore, if Congress 
begins to understand the securitization process it will help guide them in decision making 
and questioning the executive securitization of an issue.  
  An area where scholars can add to the securitization theory is by developing a 
parallel process to the overarching view of securitization by focusing on the internal 
process of securitization. The internal process, which I define as the process of 
securitizing the President, meets the same criteria of general securitization, it has an 
actor, an audience, and there is a context. Hypothetical the national security advisor 
(NSA) could act as the actor, the President would be the audience, and the context could 
be a new intelligence report or a recent action taken by an enemy state. The ex-post facto 
problem is more prolific in these instances, since most interactions between cabinet 
members and President are classified. However, a review of the interaction between the 
cabinet and the President can lead to better understanding of the threat identification 
process.   
 Chapter two will build upon Chapter one’s discussion of the securitization theory. 
In Chapter two there will be an in-depth discussion on the three securitization 
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components and the synergy of the components, which leads to the securitization move. 
Furthermore, I will set out the methodology I will in my subsequent case studies. 
Chapter three will look at the George H. Bush Presidency and his handling of the 
Gulf War. This case study will address the ad-hoc decision making, in addition to 
examining intelligence agencies actions after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Specifically, I will be 
looking at whether agencies took more risks after failing to alert the President of the 
initial Iraq invasion. Also this chapter will focus on the relationship between President 
Bush and Congress. At first glance President Bush’s action seem to align with what 
historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. defines as the Imperial President. However, President 
Bush still needed Congressional approval, so studying the dynamic between an imperial 
President and Congress will be a major theme in Chapter three.  
In Chapter four I look at the Clinton administration’s handling of Iraq. I will focus 
on 1998, the year President Clinton launched airstrikes against Iraqi WMD facilities, 
commonly referred to as Operation Desert Fox.29 During this time, Congress played an 
active role in foreign policy. On October 31, 1998, President Clinton signed the Iraq 
Liberation Act, which was the first time America formally adopted a policy of regime 
change toward Iraq. The relationship between President Clinton and Congress will be a 
major theme examined in Chapter four. 
Chapter five is the conclusion chapter. I will take important findings from the two 
previous mentioned case studies, and give some insight into the ad-hoc policy making 
process. Additionally, I provide recommendations for institutional changes as it relates to 
the threat identification process.    
                                                        
29 William M. Arkin, “The Difference Was in the Details,” The Washington Post, January 17, 1999 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/analysis.htm>. 
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The primary purpose of this thesis is not to critique the current understanding of 
American foreign policy; instead the purpose is to provide a threat construction formula. 
The question of how a state becomes a threat, is complementary with the question of why 
an actor takes aggressive foreign policy actions. Additionally, if the United States wants 
to conduct a coherent grand strategy then it is vital to create institutional guidelines for 
threat identification. 
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Chapter 2: Lit Review and Methodology 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, I will be focus on the theory of securitization as 
it relates to America’s foreign policy. The two instances of securitization I focus on, are 
the Gulf War and the Iraq Liberation Act. To grasp the process of securitization I 
developed a working formula constructed from existing securitization literature. First, I 
will review the existing securitization literature, concentrating on the three components, 
the actor, audience, and context. After a framework is developed, I labeled five variables: 
the President, Congress, the Media, the executive’s cabinet, and the domestic population, 
that will be explored via the framework in the case studies. These five variables make-up 
the marketplace of ideas and synthesized the securitization process within the United 
States.1  
A marketplace of ideas, in theory, elevates the best ideas to the forefront of the 
national dialogue.2 In countries where freedom of speech is protected, the marketplace of 
ideas is robust and prevents a privileged group from monopolizing the information. 
Authoritarian governments, where freedom of speech is not protected, are more likely to 
engage in successful propaganda campaigns. The marketplace of ideas, within the United 
States, should be robust. However, groupthink can monopolize the marketplace of ideas, 
which can lead to the stymying of dissenting views.  The case studies will attempt to 
                                                        
1 It is important to note that the market of place of ideas is prevalent within the democracy. However, this 
does not mean that a market place can fail; rather it means when the market place fails it is recognized as 
such and is not recognized as a lack of a marketplace.  
2 Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, “Testing the Marketplace of Ideas,” New York University Law Review 
90 no. 1160 (October 2015), P. 1162 
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elucidate the individual processes, and the marketplace of ideas that led to Iraq being 
securitized.  
Securitization Theory 
Thierry Balzacq is the premier scholar on matters related to securitization theory. 
Balzacq defines the process of securitization as:  
“An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artifacts are 
contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience 
to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and 
intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with 
the securitizing actor’s reasons for choice and actions, by investing the referent 
subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that 
customized policy must be immediately undertake to block it.”3  
 
To make the above definition accessible to people who have not read the 
securitization literature I will attempt to simplify each of Balzacq’s points. When Balzacq 
uses the term securitizing actor, he is referring to the person who is in a position to make 
decisions. The securitizing actor must have political capital because he will be the person 
who is trying to convince the audience to adopt his securitizing move. Political capital is 
a form of political currency, which an actor can use to influence or persuade an 
audience. 4  While it is impossible to measure political capital, most political science 
scholars agree that capital is a finite resource.5 Political capital is a prerequisite for a 
                                                        
3 Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Leonard, and Jan Ruzicka, “Securitization revisited: theory and cases”, 
International Relations 30(4) 2016: 495. 
4 Frank A. Spring, “A Fool & His Political Capital Are Soon Parted: Trump Faces New Bankruptcy,” The 
Huffington Post, March 3, 2017 <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-fool-his-political-capital-are-
soon-parted-trump_us_58b98d07e4b0fa65b844b232>. 
5 Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era (London: 
Simon and Schuster, 2009): p. 249. 
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successful securitization move, therefore an elevated statesmen, the President, or a 
committee chairman, is most likely to be a securitizing actor.6    
Techniques are available to the securitizing actor including, the power of speech 
and former successful securitization moves. If a President calls upon the audiences sense 
of patriotism that would be an example of the former technique. The audience is the 
group or individual the actor is trying to influence. Therefore, any move that does not 
require audience consent falls outside of securitization theory. For an example, when the 
President of the United States launches a drone strike that cannot be a securitization 
move. The securitization move was made when Congress delegated the power of drone 
strikes to the President, and subsequently all the policies made in the aftermath are the 
President’s prerogative. When a political actor wants to significantly shift the trajectory 
of foreign policy and affirmative audience consent is needed. Therefore, the policy shift, 
otherwise known as the securitizing move, needs an audience’s approval to be successful. 
The referent object is the thing the President wants to change, so for this thesis Iraq is the 
referent object. The final part, “customized policy must be immediately undertook to 
block it,” means the threat has to be imminent.  
In the same article where the above definition comes from, Thierry Balzacq 
refines his definition to this digestible takeaway: “the key idea underlying securitization 
is that an issue is given sufficient saliency to win the assent of the audience, which 
enables those who are authorized to handle the issue to use whatever means they deem 
                                                        
6 When a securitizing actor does not have political capital the securitization move is likely to fail, See: 
Kristian Åtland & Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the Elektron 
Incident,” Security Dialogue 40 no. 3 (June 2009). 
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most appropriate.” 7  To grasp securitization theory, the individual parts need to be 
developed: the context, the actor, and the audience, but first, I need to define the 
securitization move. 
 
 
Securitization Move 
 The securitizing actor makes a securitization move when (s)he identifies a threat 
that justifies a response. 8  The identification must be public because a private 
identification would prevent an audience from participating. Additionally, the 
identification of a threat is the first step of the securitization process and requires 
additional steps before securitization is successful. According to Rita Floyd, a 
securitization move is successful when the actors gets approval from the audience for his 
policy change.9 Furthermore, the change in policy must be justified and related to the 
security threat that was identified by the original securitization move.10 Image 1 is a 
simple mathematical equation that represents the necessary components for a successful 
securitization move. Now that the equation of a successful securitization move has been 
developed, I will now transition to define the role of each individual component.   
Image 1: The Securitization Move  
     
Context 
                                                        
7 IBID. 
8 Rita Floyd, “Extraordinary or ordinary emergency measures: what, and who, defines the ‘success’ of 
securitization?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29 no. 2 (2015) p. 684 
9 IBID. 
10 IBID. 
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 While context is usually the last part highlighted by the securitization theory, it is 
the foundation of securitization theory. The context is the time period and atmosphere 
surrounding the securitization move. During the build up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 
context was defined by the events that transpired on 9/11 and the subsequent War On 
Terror. Securitization moves made during the Cold War were made under the context of 
fighting communism.  
Another aspect of the context is the speech act, defined as a “form of linguistic 
representation that positioned a particular issue as an existential threat calling for 
extraordinary measures. 11  Within the context, the securitizing actor is the person 
performing the speech act. The speech act can either, help build a context around a 
referent object, or contextualize the referent object within the context. President George 
W. Bush’s Axis of Evil speech is an example of the former and President Ronald 
Reagan’s Evil Empire speech represents the latter. President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech 
attempted to create a connection between Iraq and terrorism, within the context of 9/11. 
Despite the lack of evidence to support his claims, President Bush was effective in using 
his speech act to prime the American people for war with Iraq.12 The USSR had already 
been labeled a threat when President Ronald Regan took office. However, President 
Regan felt the need to recontextualize the threat after President Carter’s policy of détente. 
In both instances, the actors framed their referent object as evil, inhuman, and a threat 
                                                        
11 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, Security a new Framework for Analysis (Boulder 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1997) p: 26-33. 
12 Shahira S Fahmy, Thomas J. Johnson, Wayne Wanta, & Juyan Zhang, “The path to war: Exploring a 
second-level agenda-building analysis examining the relationship among the media, the public and the 
president,” The International Communication Gazette 73 no. 4 (2011), p. 327. 
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against all of humanity. This framing is an effective heuristic in capturing audience 
assent.   
  Another part of the context framework is the constant evolving nature of 
contextual threats. A static approach to context, is problematic because it limits the 
securitization process to a single move. As shown above the success of a securitization 
move depends on a multitude of steps and therefore requires a dynamic theory. By 
looking at securitization in a vacuum, the idea of context is void and plays no significant 
role in formulating the securitization process. Take the example of the United States’ 
decision to get involved in World War I. The static approach would focus on the 
declaration of war in 1917 as the securitization move. By starting in 1917, the static 
approach discredits President Wilson’s rhetoric that started in 1915, which primed the 
American public to accept war when the time came.13 Discounting the two years prior to 
the start of the war distorts the context and the actors’ ability to securitize the issue.  
Reinforcing the need for a dynamic securitization theory, scholar Matt McDonald writes, 
“[A securitization move] may be up for question… [It] may be at the point when an issue 
is defined as a security issue, at the point when an audience backs up to the designation of 
threat, or at the point at which extraordinary measures are implemented.”14 Thus, when 
considering context an analysis of the social, political, and historical contexts 
surrounding the securitized issue are required.15 
Actor 
                                                        
13 Jason C. Flangan, Imagining the Enemy: American Presidential War Rhetoric from Woodrow Wilson to 
George W. Bush (Claremont, California: Regina Books 2009).  
14 Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security”, European Journal of International 
Relations 14(4) 2008: 578 
15 McDonald 576-577. 
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 The actor is the person who performs the speech act within the confines of the 
context. One common assumption about a securitizing actor is (s)he is a political elite. 
However, in a democracy, we have a market place of ideas, and any one person or entity 
that has enough political capital can become an actor.16 In fact, McDonald highlights the 
role that news agencies and the media play in securitizing issues via images and visual 
representations.17 Building upon this further, Holger Stritzel claims that in times of high 
uncertainty and insecurity where there is a lack of existing knowledge, traditional policy 
makers are not always the actor.18 This leads Stritzel to claim that “in these contexts of 
significantly ruptured or not yet consolidated social fields, position of power within 
discourse to ‘define security’ should not simply be assumed… an assumption of authority 
should be replaced by the empirical study of processes of authorization.”19  Therefore, a 
proper securitization theory will not assume an actor, but will empirically investigate to 
determine whom an actor is according to the securitization move.  
In the introduction, I suggested that securitization scholars create an internal 
securitization process that parallels the public securitization move. I made this suggestion 
because the President or Congress, the two traditional securitization actors, sometimes 
performs a securitization move after briefed by an actor supporting a change in policy. 
My example in the introduction was a hypothetical where the National Security Advisor 
(NSA) adopted a securitization move and then advised the President to accept the NSA’s 
preferred policy. In Chapter Five, I briefly mention this process when I suggest that 
                                                        
16 McDonald 569 
17 IBID 
18 Holger Stritzel, “Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translations of organized 
crime”, Security Dialogue 43(6) 2012: 556. 
19 IBID 
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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the original securitization actor. However, 
the securitization literature is clear; a securitizing actor must have political and social 
capital to gain audience consent.  
Therefore, I develop the notion of facilitating actors. Facilitating actors are actors 
who influence and securitize the information presented to the securitization actor, but 
lack the authorization and/or the political capital to securitize the event in public. 
Labeling these actors facilitators is not to discredit their role in the securitizing process; 
rather it highlights the bureaucratic processes that can lead to a securitizing move.20   
Audience 
The final part of the securitization equation is the role of the audience. The idea of 
an audience in the securitization literature is underdeveloped.21 It becomes difficult to 
highlight an audience who assents to the securitization of event if the audience has a 
different perspective than the securitizing actor. Additionally, Balzacq notes that the 
process of identifying an audience becomes harder when there is not a single audience 
but rather multiple audiences.22  
While there is not an agreed definition on what makes up an audience, the 
securitization literature does identify audience responsibilities. The audience can grant 
support through a formal mechanism e.g. a Congressional vote to authorize war.23 The 
domestic audience cannot give formal support because they do not have the power to vote 
                                                        
20 McDonald notes that the bureaucratic process can act in the way of a speech act that is not entirely 
verbal. However, for my analysis I will include the bureaucratic process in the actor section. 
21 Michael C. Williams, “The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory” in Thierry Balzacq (ed) 
Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 213. 
22 Balzacq 500. 
23 Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, 
European Journal of International Relations 11(2): 184.  
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yes or no on the securitization issue. Since the domestic audience cannot give formal 
support, they rely on Congress to give formal support on their behalf. However, as noted 
by Thierry Balzacq, formal support “is cloaked in the semantic repertoire of the national 
audience to win support.”24 Balzacq statement is similar to the idea of a speech act 
discussed above. An actor will frame the securitization move in its best light to win the 
assent of the audience. If the actor fails to garner support from the audience, the 
securitization move will fail. Therefore, the audience plays an essential role in the 
securitization process. 
 Furthering the complication of identifying the audience, in a democracy the 
audience can become a facilitating actor in deciding when a case of securitization fails. 
The idea that audience and actor in a securitization process are not static but rather fluid 
and evolutionary is critical to third-wave securitization.25 The common example of third-
wave securitization is the United States securitizing an issue within an international 
institution. In Dagmar Rychnovska’s work on securitization, he notes the ways that the 
United States can act as securitizing actor at the UN Security Council, but then they 
become the audience as other states have the ability to weigh in on the issue.26  To 
incorporate this idea into domestic politics, this paper will label the prominent audience 
needed for the securitizing act to happen. Within the securitization act, if the audience 
becomes a facilitating actor, it will be labeled as such.  
Methodology  
                                                        
24 IBID 185. 
25 To see an example of third-wave securitization theory see: Dagmar Rychnovska, “Securitization and the 
Power of Threat Framing, Perspectives 22(2) 2014. 
26 IBID 
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 In order to build upon the previously developed theoretical framework, I have 
decided to investigate two case studies with five constant variables. The two cases are, 
The Gulf War and the Iraq Liberation Act. These two events where chosen because they 
represented a significance departure from the previously held policies. Therefore, these 
moments meet the securitization move parameters set out earlier in this chapter.   
 To explore the case studies in depth I will be using five variables, the President, 
Congress, the Media, the political cabinet, and the domestic population. This thesis will 
follow Holger Stritzel’s recommendation, and therefore I will not assume the 
securitization actor in the case studies. By not assigning predetermined roles to the 
variables, it will allow a narrative to evolve from the evidence and the securitization 
move will become more lucid.  
 In each case study, I will rely on primary sources as a method to discover the 
securitization move. Therefore, the case study will depend heavily on the national 
security archives declassified section.27 There are some limitations to the scope of my 
study which that some documents remain classified. Even if all the documents were 
declassified the volume of the documents that one would have to read to document every 
interaction would be overwhelming. Therefore, I will depend on research guides as well 
as documents, which seem relevant to the case study in framing the securitization 
process. The process of examining documents will also include examining the 
securitizing issue before the securitizing act to determine the evolving context, which is a 
key part of the securitization framework. Since I am focusing on events that have been 
                                                        
27 For more on the National Security Archives visit: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/  
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successfully securitized I will not include my search for instances of when securitization 
could have failed because that is outside the scope of this thesis.  
 While the primary documents will help determine the governmental process of 
securitization, I developed a method to investigate the role of Congress, the Media, and 
the domestic population. For Congress, I kept a detailed record on Congressional votes 
dealing with the securitization issue as well as any hearings heard about the securitization 
issue around the time of the securitization process. Similarly, for the Media, I read op-ed 
pages of the New York Times and Washington Post during the build up to the 
securitizing event. I then evaluated what role the media played in further securitizing the 
event and whether they acted as a facilitating actor or the audience pertaining to each 
case study. Finally, when determining the role of the domestic public I looked to public 
opinion polls taken around the time of the securitization move. I not only looked at the 
event in question, but the populations’ belief on certain issues, which helped shape the 
context.       
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Chapter 3 The Bush Administration 
 
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, removed the Emir, and implemented a 
pro-Iraqi regime. The United States sat atop the international order, the Berlin Wall had 
fallen and the USSR was on the brink of collapse. Consequently, Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait provided President Bush with an opportunity to build a “new world order” based 
on the principles of deterring and punishing ‘naked aggression.’1 However, President 
Bush was constrained by the Constitution. Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution vested 
the power to declare war to the legislative branch.2 To overcome this constraint, President 
Bush started a game of chess, where he was allowed to move the pieces into an ideal 
position and then asked, or strongly suggested Congress, to accept the chess board as set.  
 President Bush deployed troops to Saudi Arabia, which is known as Operation 
Desert Shield. The decision to deploy troops was made after a series of National Security 
Council meetings, and a meeting with Britain’s Prime Minister Margret Thatcher.3 The 
cabinet for the most part was spilt between Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell.4 Secretary Cheney advocated 
for an immediate troop deployment whose stated mission would be the physical security 
of Saudi Arabia. General Powell advised caution and advocated for restraint. The power 
                                                        
1 41, George H. Bush, “Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, August 
5, 1990,” In Public Papers of the President of the United States George H. Bush, 1990 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18741&st=iraq&st1=>. 
2 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. 
3 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1995), p. 36; and 41, George H. Bush, “Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Following a 
Meeting With Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom, August 6, 1990,” In Public 
Papers of the President of the United States George H. Bush, 1990 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18747&st=iraq&st1=>. 
4 Gordon and Trainor, p. 35. 
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struggle between the civilian and military control of the armed forces was a persistent 
theme and will be discussed in more detail in the cabinet section.  
The cabinet acted as advisors to the President and did not participate in the initial 
securitizing move. The President’s decision to deploy troops did not require the consent 
of an audience member, and therefore does not meet the definition of securitization 
move. There are ongoing debates on the implicit intent of Operation Desert Shield, 
however the debate is not settled and the information is not available to draw a 
conclusion. 
 Operation Desert Shield did not require Congressional approval. Congress, the 
typically audience in matters of foreign policy, granted the President authority to deploy 
troops defensively under the 1973 War Powers Resolution.5 For the most part, members 
of Congress, the media, and the American people agreed with the President’s action and 
the current situation did not dictate any further response.6  
 After the deployment of a 100,000 troops, a number that swelled to 265,000 
during the non-securitized moment, the Bush administration started to plan an operation 
that would move America’s posture away from defense and deterrence and toward an 
offensive posture. On October 12, President Bush and his cabinet hosted a team put 
together by CENTCOM, which discussed potential offensive options in Kuwait.7 From 
all points of view this meeting was a failure, the operational plan was deemed 
insufficient. As the debate progressed it became abundantly clear that the United States 
                                                        
5 H.J. Res. 542, 93rd Congress, “War Powers Resolution,” November 7, 1973 
<https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/93/hjres542>. 
6 Congressional Quarterly, “Gulf Crisis Grows into War with Iraq,” CQ Almanac 46, (1990), 
https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal90-1118567#H2_4 
7 Trainor and Gordon, p. 139 
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lacked the necessary human capital, in the region, to rid Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.8 
Nonetheless, this meeting was the turning point for the Bush administration.  
After the meeting, President Bush implicitly abandoned the sanction and 
diplomacy route, and opted for military operations to expel Iraq from Kuwait 9  On 
November 8, 1990, President Bush announced that he intended to double the number of 
troops in the Gulf, and shift the defensive posture to an offensive posture.10 In addition to 
doubling the number of troops in the Gulf, President Bush worked closely with his UN 
ambassador, Thomas Pickering, to craft a U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), 
which gave an international coalition the ability to use “all necessary means” to force Iraq 
out of Kuwait.11 President Bush had finally set the chess board, however he still needed 
Congress’s approval. If Congress remained silent on the issue, the administration warned 
that the President would play the game without Congressional approval.12 President Bush 
preempted Congress’s role as an actor in foreign policy and regulated Congress to an 
audience role. Acquiring audience consent, which is requirement for a securitization 
move to be successful, became easier for President Bush when he placed a gun to the 
head of Congress and issued an ultimatum; vote for war or be left out of the process 
entirely. During this process, the media and the members of the cabinet played a role in 
pressuring the audience into accepting the securitizing move.  
 
Context 
                                                        
8 IBID. 
9 Trainor and Gordon, p. 141 
10 41, George H. Bush, “The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, November 8, 1990,” 
In Public Papers of the President of the United States George H. Bush, 1990, 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19019&st=iraq&st1=>. 
11 Security Council Resolution 678, s/res/678 (November 29, 1990) <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678>. 
12 Congressional Quarterly 
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 In 1989, President Bush, adopted National Security Directive (NSD) 26, the U.S. 
policy toward the Persian Gulf. Some sections remain excised, but the publicly available 
language underscored the U.S. goal in the region. The long-term vested United States’ 
interest was access to oil.13 During the 1980’s and 1990’s the United States heavily 
depended on the Middle East for domestic oil use and therefore our interests in the region 
were based on the free flow of oil. Additionally, the United States committed to the idea 
of using “necessary and appropriate use of U.S. military force” if any state came into 
conflict with the United States interest.14 NSD 26 called for the normalization of relations 
between the United States and Iraq, and stated, “Normal relations would serve our 
interest.” 15  The President and his staff maintained that normalization was in both 
countries best interest. This was the official U.S. policy until Iraq invaded Kuwait, which 
forced the United States to take a hard line against Iraqi aggression.  
 If normalization was the intended policy for the administration, Congress 
intended to punish Iraq for its chemical weapons use against Iran. This was a matter 
discussed in a meeting between Iraq’s Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Secretary of State 
James Baker. Secretary of State Baker assured FM Aziz that the administration’s official 
policy was of rapprochement and normalization of relations between the two countries.16 
Congress continued to purse and persuade the administration to take a stand against 
Saddam Hussein’s human rights violation, which led to a National Security Council 
(NSC) deputies meeting on May 26, 1990, which discussed responses to Congress’s 
                                                        
13 The Office of the President, (October 2, 1989), National Security Directive 26, Washington, DC: George 
H. Bush <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf>.    
14 IBID. 
15 IBID. 
16 DNAS collection: Iraqgate, United States, Department of State, Secret, Message From the Secretary to 
Tariq Aziz, October 21, 1989 <https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/dnsa/docview/1679130391/F9A31F1C4DE04EA7PQ/4?accountid=10141>. 
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demands.17 The NSC meeting concluded that President Bush would need to do something 
in the near future that appeased Congress, but the policy enacted should not impede 
relations between Iraq and the U.S.18 The debate between normalization of relations and 
sanctions continued until Iraq invaded Kuwait.  
 Before Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Saddam Hussein bashed Kuwait on the 
international stage. In response to President Hussein’s statement, the State Department 
sent out a cable, which stated, “the United States remains determined to ensure the free 
flow of oil in the Persian Gulf.”19  This statement was consistent with NSD 26 and 
justified President Bush’s deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia.   
Cabinet 
 The first Gulf War took place 27 years ago. With all its significance, very little 
has been written about the role of the cabinet in the lead-up to war. Chapter Four has a 
unique database that tracked the buildup to the invasion of Iraq. However, declassified 
documents for the first Gulf War are included in the “Iraqgate” a database.20 The main 
focus of the “Iraqgate” database is to track the federal government’s export program, and 
how those credits were used to purchase military arms.21 The lack of documents made it 
necessary to rely on secondary sources to tell the story of the cabinet’s role in the 
securitizing move. When applicable and available, primary documents were used. 
                                                        
17 DNAS collection: Iraqgate, United States, Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Secret, NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq, May 29,1990, White; 
House Situation Room, 4:30 p.m., May 26, 1990 <https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/dnsa/docview/1679129413/148580CC205D4767PQ/14?accountid=10141>. 
18 IBID. 
19 DNAS collection: Iraqgate, United States, Department of State, Confidential, Iraqi Letter to Arab League 
Threatening Kuwait, July 19, 1990  <https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/dnsa/docview/1679130384/F138F59FFF214311PQ/39?accountid=10141>. 
20 DNAS collection: Iraqgate.  
21 David Shaw, “Iraqgate – A Case Study of a Big Story With Little Impact,” LA Times, October 27, 1992, 
<http://www.latimes.com/food/la-me-shaw27oct27-story.html>. 
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Consequently, this section will deviate from the research methods, laid out in the second 
chapter, and use Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor’s book The 
Generals’ War as the primary source to examine the role of the cabinet in the 
securitization process. However, the use of Gordon and Trainor’s book cannot tell the full 
story because it was written only four years after The Gulf War, and therefore the book 
does not contain an assessment of recently declassified documents. Future scholars 
should visit the Bush library where you can find copies of all NSC meetings conducted 
during the build-up to the securitizing move.22  
 As mentioned in the context section, the administration was unprepared for Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait. On July 25, 1990, the Joint Chiefs of Staff penned an Intelligence 
Information Report (IIR), which laid out Iraq’s ambition in the Persian Gulf.23 Most of 
the document remains excised, but from the few lines that can be read it is obvious that 
the administration underestimated Iraq’s ambitions. In section 3 labeled, “Iraq’s 
ambitions toward Kuwait” the Joint Chief assessed, “if Iraq did attack, it would be to gain 
a part and not to dominate Kuwait.” 24  The next day, July 26, 1990, the Policy 
Coordination Committee (PCC) met and discussed the “Protection of U.S. Interests in the 
Persian Gulf.”25 Once again the Joint Chiefs seemed to be fixated on the idea that Iraq 
had no intentions to invade Kuwait. The main takeaway from the position paper were, the 
                                                        
22 George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, “NSC Meetings-George H.W. Bush Administration (1989-
1993), June 27, 2013, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/NSC%20Meetings%201989-1992--
Declassified--2013-06-27--REVISED.pdf>. 
23 DNAS collection: Iraqgate, United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, classification excised, IIR 
[Excised] Iraq’s Ambition [Intelligence Information Report, July 25, 1990 <https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/dnsa/docview/1679141279/BAC46969FAEB411APQ/31?accountid=10141>. 
24 IBID. 
25 DNAS collection: Iraqgate, United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and 
Policy, Secret, PCC [Policy Coordination Committee]; on Protection of U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 
July 26, 1990 <https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/dnsa/docview/1679140768/BAC46969FAEB411APQ/35?accountid=10141>. 
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United States should not bash Iraq and Saddam Hussein did not want to confront the 
United States.26 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, led by General Colin Powell, wrote both the 
report and the position paper. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush marginalized 
General Powell’s voice in favor of more hawkish cabinet members, Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. There is no available 
evidence to correlate the marginalization of General Powell’s recommendations with his 
pre-invasion assessment, however President Bush’s decisions is a clear signal that 
General Powell did not have the ear of the President. 
 In addition to General Powell’s incorrect assessment of Iraq’s intention, the 
intelligence agency failed to alert the President of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Gordon and 
Trainor’s book starts with Charlie Allen, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for 
warning.27 According to Gordon and Trainor’s account NIO Allen was aware and alert of 
the possibility of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, NIO Allen’s voice was lost in 
the fray, and the general consensus was the intelligence branch had failed.28    
 As hypothesized in Chapter 1 if an organization failed then there would be 
tremendous pressure on that organization to avoid future failure. Since governmental 
organizations are not punished for being risk-takers, organizations are incentivized to 
overestimate threats. An example of this hypothesis is the intelligence community’s 
assessments after Iraq invaded Kuwait. After catching the majority of flak for its failure 
to inform the President about Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the intelligence community 
consistently overestimated and misstated Iraq’s intentions. On August 23, 1990, 
                                                        
26 IBID. 
27 Gordon and Trainor, P. 3. 
28 Gordon and Trainor, P. 28-30, Cheney’s Spokesman, Pete Williams, is quoted as saying “We had an 
intelligence community failure.” P. 34.  
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CENTCOM’s intelligence branch reported that Iraq had set up chemical decontamination 
equipment.29 The equipment can only be used after a chemical weapon attack. Gordon 
and Trainor concluded that the threat was a false alarm, “It was the first of many 
intelligence reports that predicted, erroneously, that Iraq intended to use poison gas.”30 
Additional intelligence reports misidentified Iraq’s military intentions. According to 
Gordon and Trainor, the military relied on defectors to gather intelligence on Iraq’s 
military plans, and the defectors relayed that Iraq had planned an offensive attack against 
Saudi Arabia. 31  Similar to the intelligence report on the possible use of chemical 
weapons, this report was false, however it “contributed mightily to [Gen.] Schwarzkopf’s 
sense of apprehension.”32  After they failed to warn the President of Iraq’s intention to 
invade Kuwait, the intelligence community became more active in the inflation of the 
Iraq threat.  
 As indicated in the introduction, a major theme prior to the deployment of troops 
was the strife between the civilian and military leadership. Following Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with essential military 
personnel, met at the Pentagon and discussed policy options in response to Iraq’s ‘naked 
aggression.’ Gordon and Trainor referred to the discussion that followed as ‘battle lines’ 
being drawn. The civilian side favored rolling back Iraqi aggression and the military 
personnel urged caution.33 Gordon and Trainor attested that the meeting ended abruptly, 
                                                        
29 Gordon and Trainor, P. 64. 
30Gordon and Trainor, P. 64-65. 
31Gordon and Trainor, P. 65. 
32 IBID. 
33 Gordon and Trainor, P. 31. 
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when Secretary of Defense Cheney ordered “I want some options, General.”34 The chain 
of command dictated that General Powell had to follow through with any order from 
Secretary Cheney, despite Cheney’s lack of military service. Therefore, General Powell’s 
voice had been mitigated on the institutional level.  
 The military suffered from a lack of plans related to the restoration of Kuwait’s 
sovereignty. Before the Iraq invaded Kuwait, the military conducted zero military war 
games or strategy sessions on the best practice to deter Iraqi aggression.35 It became quite 
obvious that the military lacked prior knowledge of the issue when President Bush asked 
for potential offensive strategies. On October 12th, a group of presenters from 
CENTCOM presented the militaries offensive options.36 By all standards the presentation 
was a failure, and was rejected by hawkish cabinet members, Dick Cheney and Brent 
Scowcroft. After the meeting, Secretary Cheney accused General Powell of slow play, 
which furthered the division between Cheney and Powell.37 Forgoing other options, the 
White House asked CENTCOM to develop a plan with double the force size.38  
 Once the decision was made to deploy troops in an offensive manner, the cabinet 
played a significant role in the securitization process. The cabinet belittled the separation 
of powers and Congress’s ability to declare war. In two instances key cabinet members, 
James Baker and Dick Cheney, told Congress that the President had the authority to act 
offensively without Congressional consent. Secretary Baker met with both branches of 
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Congress on subsequent days, October 17 and 18.39 These hearings were held before 
President Bush formally announced America’s offensive intentions, but these hearings 
exposed the administrations disdain for Congress’s Constitutional powers. During the 
House’s Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, on October 18, Congressman Theodore 
Weiss and Secretary Baker had a back and forth discussion of the President’s legal 
authority to order an offensive strike. The back and forth is quintessential to 
understanding the President and the cabinet’s mindset on the role of Congress as an actor 
during the Iraqi crisis.    
Mr. Weiss: But it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, in fact you make a decision as the 
Executive Branch that you want to go to war in an offensively military fashion, 
that you ought to find that you have the support of the American people through 
their elected representatives. I don't understand why you have such little faith in 
the democratic process that you would say, well, "we will consult." The 
Constitution is quite clear. It is up to Congress to declare war.  
 
Secretary BAKER. Mr. Weiss, is it war if we respond in what you would 
probably think is an appropriate way to the murder of some American civilians in 
Iraq?  
 
Mr. Weiss. I was very careful in saying offensive military action on the part of the 
Administration, on the part of our government.  
 
Secretary BAKER. The response in all probability would not be defensive.  
 
Mr. WEISS. Even in that instance, it seems to me you would want to come to the 
Congress and have the Congress tell you, yes, this is such a serious violation, you 
ought to go to war. Wouldn't you want to do that?  
 
Secretary BAKER. We expect to consult and we will consult. As I said in the 
other body yesterday, I think it would be self-defeating if we came back, the 
Congress was called back to session, take the example I just gave you, called 
back into session and we have days of debate about whether and what we 
should or should not do. Don't use this air wing, use this one over here or don't 
use that division, use this one over here (Emphasis added).40 
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In his last statement, Secretary Baker explicitly distorted Congress’s proper role 
related to the war process. Congressman Weiss did not want to debate the military 
strategy or undermine the war plans, rather he wanted to vote on any offensive action, a 
Constitutional power granted to Congress. However, when Secretary Baker conflated the 
two ideas, he effectively announced that the President did not intend for Congress 
participation, because, Congress would burden the war process.    
Following that back and forth, Congressman Weiss reminded Secretary Baker that 
even when American’s were attacked after Pearl Harbor, President FDR asked Congress 
to declare war. Once again Secretary Baker rejected the notion that Congress was needed 
in the case of an offensive attack, and stated, “You [Congress] are not going to bless our 
action in advance.”41  
Secretary Cheney, who was more hawkish than Secretary Baker, reiterated that 
the President did not need official consent from Congress to launch an offensive attack 
against Iraq. In a back and forth conversation with Congressman Ron Dellums, Secretary 
Cheney pointed to previous Presidential actions and noted that the U.S. military had been 
involved in over 200 military conflicts but war had only been declared 5 times. 42 
Additionally, Secretary Cheney compared an offensive action to the U.S. action in the 
1950’s when President Truman used a U.N. mandate to bypass Congress and declare war 
on North Korea.43 This was a fair comparison and therefore powerful because precedent 
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dictated that Congressional authority was not required when the U.N. had consented to 
the use of force. The rhetoric used by the Bush cabinet was consistent in message and 
tone, the President did not need Congressional approval to launch an offensive attack 
against Iraq. The consistency of the message diminished Congress’s ability to make a 
decision on U.S. strategy and led CQ Almanac to conclude, “much of the debate was a 
sense that the legislative branch had acted too late to have any real choice except to back 
Bush in his showdown with Iraq.”44 This sense of hopelessness was accomplished in 
three parts, the cabinet’s actions after the securitization move, which was discussed 
above, the President’s securitizing move, and Congress’s role as an audience rather than 
an actor, a feature discussed later in this chapter.  
The President  
 President Bush is considered one of the most successful foreign policy 
president. 45  During his time in office President Bush deposed the Panama dictator 
Manuel Noriega, facilitated the fall of the USSR, and threw Iraq out of Kuwait. However, 
President Bush decisions were not always played within the boundaries of the 
Constitution. His decision to offensively deploy troops to Iraq, President Bush acquiesced 
approval from Congress through coercive rhetoric and measures. Furthermore, President 
Bush inflated the threat of Saddam Hussein, and constantly compared Hussein to Adolf 
Hitler. The image of Kuwait being Poland and Saddam being Hitler was an effective tool 
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that primed the American people for war.46 The following section will explore, how 
President Bush became the primary securitizing actor, his rhetoric, and the strategy used 
to coerce Congress. 
 The cabinet section discussed, the executive branch’s lack of preparation for 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush 
addressed the media and strongly condemned Iraq’s action but did not offer a policy 
option nor a strategy the United States would take to reverse the acts of aggression.47 
Later that day, President Bush signed an executive order that froze Iraqi assets and 
prohibited any future transactions between U.S. entities and Iraq.48 At this time President 
Bush did not plan to use the United States military.49 During the early days of the Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait, the President treaded water because a formal policy decision had not 
yet been made. However, the lukewarm response soon became hawkish as the United 
States deployed of 100,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. 
 The United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, Margret Thatcher, significantly 
influenced President Bush’s decision to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia.50 The pair met at 
the Aspen conference on August 3. At the meeting, Prime Minister Thatcher used an 
analogy that became a common line used by President Bush, the Iraq invasion was 
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similar to the 1930’s German aggression in Europe.51 President Bush’s press conference 
with Margret Thatcher was the first time President Bush uttered the phrase “naked 
aggression” and promised that “Iraq’s aggression would not stand.”52 Just hours before 
the press conference, President Bush told the press that he had not considered 
intervention in Kuwait. Therefore, a link can be made between President Bush’s 
statement and Margret Thatcher’s influence. However, some historical books oversell the 
role of Prime Minister Thatcher’s influence and thus undermine President Bush’s role as 
the final arbitrator in America’s decision to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia. 53  With 
hindsight and declassified documents the truth falls somewhere in the middle. President 
Bush did tell the press that America was not considering intervention in Kuwait, but that 
statement was likely influenced by the lack of concrete policy options given the surprise 
of the Iraq invasion. The cabinet section mentioned the debate on August 2, where the 
cabinet was divided on policy options and the deployment of military was an option 
favored by Secretary of Defense Cheney. In historical and political context, the meeting 
with Margret Thatcher did not imbalance the scales, between diplomacy and forward 
deployment, rather it was a reconfirmation of President Bush’s preferred policy 
decision.54   
 After the Aspen conference, President Bush decided that America’s policy should 
be rooted in the rollback of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.55 The decision to send troops to 
Saudi Arabia was made solely by President Bush and took some of his cabinet members 
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by surprise. After President Bush’s press conference on August 5, the spokeswomen for 
Secretary of State Baker said, “What’s got into him?”56 While President Bush’s tough 
rhetoric on Iraq was a change in U.S. foreign policy and the subsequent deployment of 
troops significantly deviated from the norm it did not act as the securitization move. All 
of President Bush’s interactions with the media and available declassified documents 
dismisses the idea that the original decision to deploy troops was anything more than a 
strictly defensive deployment. In his address to the nation on August 8, President Bush 
laid out the four guiding principles, which were consistent with NSD 26. The four 
guiding principles were: Complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the 
restoration of the Kuwaiti government, a stable Persian Gulf, and the protection of 
Americans abroad. 57  During the address to the nation, President Bush claimed that 
Saddam Hussein was the modern day Hitler and therefore the United States would not sit 
by as Saddam displayed naked aggression against a sovereign nation.58 To develop the 
context for the future offensive aggression, the President inflated the threat of Saddam 
Hussein.  
 Chapter two discusses the speech act and its relation to context of the 
securitization move. A speech act relies on a linguistic reservoir, which Holger Stritzel 
defines as, “set of analogies, similes, and contrasts that help an actor frame the 
securitization issue at hand.”59 President Bush decision to compare Saddam Hussein to 
Hitler is consistent with past security actor’s use of the speech act. Similar to President 
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Wilson’s speech acted, which primed the American people to accept the United States 
role in the First World War, President Bush began to prime Congress for war with Iraq. 
The effectiveness of this comparison is documented by securitization scholars and 
international relations scholars alike.60 As the President decision making progressed he 
continued the comparison between Saddam and Hitler. When the President announced his 
decision to offensively deploy troops the image in the audience’s head was one of Hitler 
and 1930’s Europe.  
 On October 12, 1990, President Bush did not announce his intentions for a 
military offensive action, because an announcement would have sparked a debate among 
the American people, who were headed to the ballot box for the midterm elections. The 
midterms were not a referendum on U.S. grand strategy in the Persian Gulf, and the 
inaction from President Bush, since the first deployment of troops alluded to a strategy, 
which relied on comprehensive international sanctions. 61  Between the October 11 
meeting and President Bush’s announcement to offensively deploy troops, on November 
8, 1990, the President was only questioned about the Persian Gulf five times. 62 On 
October 29, 1990, President Bush was asked how he felt about Senator Cohen’s 
statement that the President needed congressional approval to commit offensive troops in 
the Middle East. President Bush responded, “History is replete with examples where the 
President has had to take action. And I've done this in the past and certainly -- somebody 
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mentioned provocation -- would have no hesitancy at all.” 63  This language strongly 
resembled the language used by the cabinet after the deployment of offensive troops. The 
following week President Bush used rhetoric, which threatened offensive operations 
against the Iraqi government if they impeded the United States efforts to resupply the 
embassy in Kuwait.64 The Iraqi treatment of U.S. personnel was used as justification for 
the deployment of offensive troops, even though some media members questioned the 
President’s claims.65 On November 1, 1990, President Bush held a news conference and 
the majority of questions asked dealt with the President’s new found aggression toward 
Iraq. Many of the questions asked if the President was preparing the American people for 
war with Iraq, to which President Bush responded that he preferred the diplomatic 
option.66 However, President Bush did not deny that he was considering a military option. 
As rumors swirled, very little happened between November 1, and November 8, the date 
the President announced the deployment of offensive troops.  
 CQ Almanac described President Bush’s announcement on November 8, as a 
“post-election surprise.”67  However, the President privately planned his securitization 
move for the better part of a month and the continued comparison between Saddam and 
Hitler gave the President the context needed to make the announcement. President Bush 
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tried to frame the shift in posture as a signal of strength.68 However, President Bush pre-
decided that force would be needed to accomplish the goals he set out on August 8, 1990. 
Therefore, this public announcement acts as the securitization moment because the 
President officially announced a change in U.S. policy from defensive to offensive. This 
move needed consent from a co-equal actor, in this case the United States Congress. 
Gaining Congressional consent was set to be a political battle, and therefore to better his 
odds the President begun a campaign to undermine Congress’s role as an actor. 
 The President relied on two tools to undermine Congress’s constitutional 
authority, a U.N. mandate and his cabinet. The latter was discussed in the cabinet section, 
therefore this section will take up the former. On November 29, 1990, the United Nations 
Security Council agreed to Resolution 678, by a 12-2 vote.69 Resolution 678 granted the 
international community the right to use force to rid Kuwait of Iraq, if Iraq failed to 
voluntary remove troops by January 15.70 CQ Almanac noted, the administration worked 
on this resolution for over six weeks, which coincided with the week after the October 12 
military meeting.71 President Bush knew a congressional debate would be contentious 
and the effort to secure a majority could be futile, so he pursed a U.N. mandate that acted 
as an insurance policy for his preferred policy. The U.N. resolution put a hard deadline on 
Congress to make a decision. House Majority Leader Gephardt disapproved of the 
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President’s methods and stated, “The countries that are voting today are not the countries 
that are going to have their young people dying.”72  
 As time ticked down and President Bush’s cabinet testified that congressional 
approval was not needed for an offensive operation, Congress was stuck in between a 
rock and a hard place. President Bush had played a game of risk, and set up his chess 
board without going through the proper channels. Once the board was set Congress had 
to play the pieces as they stood. Congress’s decision making will be discussed in the next 
section, but it is important to explore the catch 22 Congress was in. On one hand 
Congress could have held a vote before the President formally asked for an authorization 
to use force. If that was the route Congress took then the President could have passed the 
burden of the war onto Congress and claimed that Congress jumped the gun on the 
diplomatic option. However, if they did nothing the Bush administration had been 
transparent, the President did not need a Congressional mandate to launch an offensive 
operation. Not only did President Bush set the chess board how he liked but then he also 
dictated to Congress that if they moved they lost and if they did nothing they lost. 
According to CQ, the letter President Bush sent to Congress avoided the question of 
congressional power and was a mere formality, rather than a legal request. 73  The 
President as the securitizing actor had coerced Congress to support his preferred policy.  
Congress 
 The previous two sections highlighted the administration’s strategy used to coerce 
congress. As noted in the introduction, individual members of Congress pushed for 
sanctions against the Iraq regime as early as 1989. However, sanctions a country against 
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chemical weapons use is different than a vote to send American’s to die for a 
questionable national interest. Congress’s role as an actor was mitigated by the cabinet, 
the President, and the institution of Congress.  
 When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Congress was out of session.74 Traditionally Congress 
does not meet in Washington D.C. during the month of August, rather they conduct 
official business in their home districts/states. Therefore, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 
August 2, 1990, Congress was on recess and did not reconvene until the first week of 
September. This long gap of time, in addition to the President’s Constitutional authority 
as commander in chief, gave the President authority to make decisions on troop 
deployment. Even if Congress was in session, the President under the War Powers 
Resolution had the power to deploy troops for up to 60 days without Congressional 
approval. 75  These circumstances led most members of Congress to praise President 
Bush’s decision to deploy troops as a deterrent against potential future aggression from 
Iraq.76 
 As Congress reconvened and the 60 day deadline neared a debate started to brew 
on Congress’s role related to the War Powers Resolution. Legally, Congress needed to 
approve of President Bush’s deployment of troops or President Bush would have been 
forced to remove the 100,000+ troops that were stationed in Saudi Arabia. However, 
President Bush did not believe the War Powers Resolution was constitutional and 
therefore was not obligated to ask Congress for an extension or continued funding for the 
troops in Saudi Arabia. Similar to the catch 22 Congress faced later, Congress could 
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defund the deployment of troops and undermine the U.S. strategic deterrence in the 
Persian Gulf or they could acquiesce their Constitutional authority to the President and 
fully fund the President’s initiative. Congress chose the latter, and passed a resolution 
that supported the actions taken up to that enactment of the resolution, but did not grant 
the President Constitutional authority to act in an offensive manner. The last point is 
important because the debate about the resolution’s intent tried to avoid a Gulf of Tonkin 
situation.77  
 Individual members were once again away from chambers when the President 
announced that America would shift its posture from defensive to offensive. 
Congressional members were in their district for the midterm election when on 
November 8, President Bush announced that he was doubling the number of troops in the 
Persian Gulf and the mission of the newly deployed troops included an offensive 
component. After some members proposed a special session, which was rejected, 
Congress settled for on hearings.78 As Congress returned to session, the President had 
received a U.N. mandate via UNSCR 678. As Senator Kennedy noted, the doubling of 
troops was the writing on the wall that America was headed to war with Iraq.79  
 Congress now faced the question, was it possible to have an unbiased debate 
about the proper role of American power, when the President had an U.N. mandate and 
had previously claimed that Congress was not needed in making the final decision. 
During this time, the Washington Post op-ed page demanded that Congress vote on the 
offensive deployment of troops. However, as Ted Koppel noted in his op-ed “Congress 
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Should Debate Now,” with America being on the road to war the super-charged setting 
did not allow for a neutral debate to take place.80 Furthermore, the framing from the 
White House and the media – more on the media in the next section – framed the debate 
as a democracy versus a thuggish, evil regime.81 Finally, Congress had been previously 
ridiculed by the administration and the media for its failure to vote on the War Powers 
Resolution. On November 22, 1990, Jim Hoagland in his op-ed “Congress, Bush and the 
Generals” pointed to Congress’s refusal to vote on the War Powers Resolution. To 
Hoagland this represented Congress’s lack of resolve on the Iraq issue.82  
 Even with being constrained, Congress managed to hold hearings in both 
chambers on the pros and cons of America’s decision to go to war. However, when 
Congress held meetings with cabinet leaders the message was a clear and consistent, the 
President did not need Congressional authority to launch an offensive operation against 
Iraq. To counteract this message a handful of Congressional members sued the President 
and asked a federal judge for a ruling on the President’s Constitutional power to launch 
an offensive operation without Congressional approval. 83  This action represented 
Congress’s attempt to claim a role as an actor. Unfortunately the action backfired as the 
                                                        
80 Ted Koppel, “Congress Should Debate Now,” The Washington Post, November 14, 1990 
<https://advance-lexis-com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=beacd312-babb-4b65-
bb41-
9a6d417ba112&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3SJF-
9MN0-002S-T4FT-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3SJF-9MN0-002S-T4FT-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=8075&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=Ly_k&earg=sr0&prid=68de
ee58-b64c-4544-9d40-4224a57ccd99>. 
81 See: Scot McDonald 
82 Jim Hoagland, “Congress, Bush and the Generals,” The Washington Post, November 22, 1990 
<https://advance-lexis-com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=6e21bf16-75c2-4c2d-
8a08-
0c385f12cd35&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3SJF-
9K70-002S-T2P2-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3SJF-9K70-002S-T2P2-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=8075&pdteaserkey=sr6&pditab=allpods&ecomp=Ly_k&earg=sr6&prid=7a5e
7c3f-d3e2-412d-9f82-f37588f4ae55>. 
83 Congressional Quarterly  
51 
 
judge ruled that it was up the majority of Congress to decide if the President had the 
authorization to launch a war without their approval. The judge kicked the can back to 
Congress and failed to answer the underlying question, could the President subvert 
Congress’s role as an actor on issues concerning war?84  
 As the sand ran out of the hour glass and hearings commenced, Congress 
considered multiple policy issues. With the President ready to go to war, Congress 
needed to contemplate the effectiveness of sanctions, how long an anti-Iraq coalition 
could be held together, and how America would deem success if war was conducted. 
During these hearings Congress did its due diligence as they hosted intellectual diverse 
panels who offered a comprehensive analysis on the Iraq question. 85  The hearings 
elucidated the administration’s preferred policy and Democrats who preferred economic 
sanctions, made clear the decision to go to war was the Presidents’. During a hearing 
Senator Sarbanes stated, “We’ve abandoned that [sanction] policy, and we've shifted off 
to a course now which I think is going to take us into conflict.”86 Additionally, Senator 
Nunn, the chair of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, questioned Secretary Cheney’s 
resolve for sanctions. “If we have a war, we're never going to know whether they 
[sanctions] would work, are we? That's the point.” 87  Ted Koppel’s assessment was 
correct, a neutral debate held within the halls of Congress was not attainable and the sand 
had almost reached the bottom of the hour glass. 
 As the January 15, 1991, deadline approached Congress at the encouragement of 
the President, voted on the authorization of force. At this time 400,000 U.S. troops were 
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stationed in Saudi Arabia and they were joined by 600,000 international coalition 
forces.88 Congress took up the issue on January 8, 1991, and debated the decision for four 
days. On the fourth day of debate the Senate passed S J Resolution 2 and the House 
passed H J Resolution 77 which granted the President the right to use force.89 Congress 
upheld its Constitutional authority, but the vote was undermined by the parameters set by 
the President. Congress, who constitutionally should play an equal role in the securitizing 
move, was downgraded to an audience role. Additionally, Congress was restricted as an 
audience because of the parameters set by the actor, and therefore could not assent or 
dissent to the actors securitizing move, but rather were coerced into accepting the 
preferred policy of the President. 
The Media 
 As the President reacted to the events as they unfolded, the media was a medium 
for intellectuals to write about the need for a more aggressive foreign policy. The media 
relied on common tropes, Saddam as Hitler and the 1990’s Middle East as 1930’s Europe 
that created a context, which the President used to take a hardline against Iraq. However, 
a couple voices in the Washington Post, Richard Cohen and Milton Viorst, were critical 
of President Bush’s strategy in the Persian Gulf. To understand the role of the media 
during this securitization move. Two time periods are examined, the deployment of 
troops to Saudi Arabia and the President’s decision to shift to an offensive posture. For 
the latter examination this section will exclude the New York Times. During this time 
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period the New York Times op-eds are pro-Bush, and therefore the analysis for the first 
section can be applied to the second section.  
New York Times 
 An analysis of eight New York Times op-eds from August 3, 1990, to August 13, 
1990, found that the New York Time’s was unequivocally supportive of President Bush’s 
Iraq policy. All eight articles selected are by the New York Times editorial board, which 
might explain the bias toward President Bush. As chapter 4 will show, the New York 
Times op-ed page were restrictive during this time period which lead to op-eds of similar 
content and political alignment.  
 On August 3, 9, 10, and 13 the New York Times applauded President Bush for 
decisions related to Iraq. On August 3, the op-ed is title “Iraq’s Naked Aggression” and 
was written after President Bush’s press conference with Margret Thatcher.90 Not only 
does the op-ed use President Bush’s language it also affirmed that President Bush took 
the first step to counter Iraqi aggression. President Bush did not take any policy steps that 
countered Iraqi aggression on August 3. Despite the lack of policy, President Bush 
received good marks from the New York Times editorial board. The August 9, article 
“The U.S. stands Up. Who Else?” stated, “On balance President Bush has made the right 
choice in the right way.”91 Likewise, on August 13, in an article titled “Autocracy and 
Democracy in the Sand” the article stated, “Americans are on the right side of this quarrel 
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and of history.”92 These selections read more like a Presidential press release than a 
serious analysis of the issue at hand. The New York Times was an essential element in 
the construction of context for President Bush.  
 In his book, George Bush’s War, Jean Edward Smith accused the New York 
Times and Washington Post of inflating the Iraq threat. Smith claimed that the 
“Administration began a concerted press campaign to emphasize the danger posed to 
Saudi Arabia by Saddam. Both The New York Times and the Washington Post, carried 
front-page stories on Saturday, August 4, that Iraqi forces were massing at the frontier, 
ready to invade.”93 Whether the administration used the media to push their narrative falls 
outside the scope of this thesis but it is important to note that the interaction between the 
media and the President is not a one way street and the media can be manipulated to push 
the President’s preferred policy option. I mention this here because the New York Times 
op-ed used similar language to the White House and helped to create a positive context 
for the administration actions.  
Washington Post 
 The Washington Post op-ed page was particularly active during the two 
mentioned time periods. With the level of activity being much higher than the New York 
Times, I had to randomly select op-eds, therefore all op-eds during this time were not 
selected. In randomly selecting op-eds I tried to avoid confirmation and selection bias. 
Similar to the New York Times, the Washington Post supported and pushed the 
President’s agenda during the build up to Operation Desert Shield. After the November 8, 
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securitization move, the Washington Post begun a pressure campaign that targeted 
Congress. The framing and the tone of the op-eds during this time are closely related to 
the cabinet’s message. The following section will examine sixteen op-eds between 
August 3, and August 23, and twelve op-eds between November 1, and November 22.  
 Charles Krauthammer wrote the first op-ed analyzed and it was published on 
August 3.94 The content of the article is relevant to the topic at hand, however the bigger 
impact of this op-ed was the framing of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. Krauthammer 
argued that the United States was justified in supporting Iraq over Iran during the 1980 
war, because in Krauthammer words “remember we [the U.S.] supported Stalin over 
Hitler.”95 However, after the Iran-Iraq war concluded Krauthammer claimed the United 
States failed to deter Iraq, which led to Iraqi aggression in the region. Krauthammer 
concluded with an analogy that would become popular with the administration, the Arab 
world faced a situation similar to Europe in the 1930’s. 96  Krauthammer’s used the 
linguistic reservoir, to play upon people’s fear of Hitler and another World War. This 
framing gave President Bush’s use of the analogy credibility. As more people stated the 
similarities between the two situations it hardened the credibility of the statement and the 
comparison with the American people and Congress. 
 Similar to Krauthammer’s op-ed, George Will wrote an op-ed on August 3, titled 
“Wolf Out of Babylon.”97 George Will argued that the comparison between Hussein and 
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Mussolini was misguided because Hussein was a much more vicious and evil when 
compared to Mussolini. 98  Additionally, George Will invoked Munich and stated the 
lesson learned from World War II was: “when it is necessary to confront an expansionist 
dictator, sooner is better than later.”99 In the first couple days after Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, the Washington Post op-ed pages created a context that the world faced World 
War III. Furthermore, the United States must confront Saddam to avoid the mistakes 
made during the 1930’s. This comparison granted the administration a moral high 
ground, if a decision needed to be made then the audience would have to side with 
President Bush or Hitler.  
  As the shock and awe of Operation Desert Storm wore off, the Washington Post 
op-ed section discussed President Bush’s next step. Op-ed writers took one of two sides; 
the United States must be the aggressor and rid the world of Saddam or the United States 
should be cautious and avoid escalation. Those in favor of the former policy option were 
David Broder, Jim Hoagland and Irving Kristol. 100  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sharif S. 
Elmusa, and Paul H. Nitze argued in favor of the latter.101 During the build up to the 
securitization move, the intellectually diversity displayed by the Washington Post op-eds 
should be considered the gold standard. The previous analysis of the New York Times 
                                                                                                                                                                     
77acc050fc52&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3SJF-
B770-002S-T55M-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=8075&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true>. 
98 IBID. 
99 IBID. 
100 David S. Broder, “Reactive President,” The Washington Post, August 19, 1990 
<https://goo.gl/8gSw3c>; Jim Hoagland, “Saddam’s Last Fantasy,” The Washington Post, August 21, 1990 
<https://goo.gl/samzXK>; Irving Kristol, “The Gulf: Born-Again Isolationists…” The Washington Post, 
August 22, 1990 <https://goo.gl/ReAkdW>. 
101 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The True U.S. Interest in the Gulf,” The Washington Post, August 16, 1990 
<https://goo.gl/zmo4hd>; Shari S. Elmusa, “Take Saddam Seriously,” The Washington Post, August 23, 
1990 <https://goo.gl/xk4tUy>; Paul H. Nitze, “Getting the Good of This Crisis; Let’s use it to improve 
superpower collaboration,” The Washington Post, August 26, 1990 <https://goo.gl/dtZNMu>. 
57 
 
and Washington Post have shown a bias toward the securitization actor’s preference and 
both papers subsequently engaged in the securitization move as facilitating actor. 
However, this debate between the two camps can be used as an example of the media 
attempt to be a neutral arbitrator of policy. 
A constant theme in the lead up to President Bush’s securitizing move, on 
November 8, was that he had mismanaged the Iraq issue up to that point. On November 
1, and November 7, the Washington Post ran op-eds that questioned President Bush’s 
decision making and his public campaign, which attempted to win domestic support for 
war. 102  Richard Cohen’s article, “Saving Face and Lives” was critical of the Bush 
administration’s rhetorical build up to war. Cohen did not disagree with President Bush, 
as they both agreed that there was sufficient reasons for war with Iraq. Rather he 
disagreed with President Bush’s methods of threat inflation. Furthermore, Cohen 
advocated for President Bush to tell the truth to the American people if war became a 
necessary tool.103 In the same light George Will’s article “Did You Ever See a Policy Go 
This Way and That?” questioned the administrations inconsistent rhetoric.104 Noted in the 
article, is President Bush argument that the embargo was working but that the embargo 
was not enough to expel Saddam from Kuwait.105 The source of the inconsistent message 
was President Bush’s private intentions, which he would announce the following day, and 
the current stated policy that the United Stated had adopted. However, the criticism of 
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President Bush dissipated after he announced the United States shift in posture within the 
Persian Gulf.  
 After President Bush’s announcement on November 8, the Washington Post 
editorial board ran two op-eds that called upon Congress to debate the issue of offensive 
deployment. On November 11, and November 14, the Washington Post applauded 
President Bush for his action and then deemed that it was Congress’s responsibility to 
vote up or down on President Bush’s policy.106 However, as mentioned in the previous 
section Congress faced skewed parameters that restricted the means for a fair and neutral 
debate. Ted Koppel stated as much in his op-ed “Congress Should Debate Now” on 
November 14.107 With Congress being out of session and not set to reconvene until after 
the Thanksgiving holiday, the call for immediate debate fell on deaf ears.  
  When it came to Congressional debate, many writers assessed Congress as the 
audience in the securitizing move. Both, Charles Krauthammer and Jim Hoagland 
implicitly acknowledged that Congress was being coerced. 108  In “The Case for 
Reconvening Congress” Krauthammer referred to the doubling of troops as a “use it or 
lose it deployment.”109 Furthermore, Krauthammer stated that President Bush’s statement 
was an executive deceleration of war and Congress must vote, on the approval of the 
President’s policy.110 Similar to Krauthammer, Jim Hoagland claimed that President Bush 
had to take his message directly to the public because Congress viewed President Bush, 
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and not Saddam Hussein, as the enemy.111 This rhetoric is consistent with the President’s 
action that war had been declared by the executive and Congress only had one option, 
vote yes.  
 Besides a few dissenting opinions the Washington Post and the New York Times 
op-ed pages built context and supported the securitization move. Furthermore, after the 
securitizing move only one Washington Post op-ed was critical of the President’s policy 
and called for a serious discussion of the implications of the preferred policy. 112  In 
addition to the cabinet and Presidential action, the press belittled the institutional role of 
Congress. 
The American Public 
 The American public was receptive and reacted in a positive manner when 
President Bush announced that he intended to send troops to Saudi Arabia. President 
Bush enjoyed a 27% increase in approval for his Iraq policy after he made the public 
announcement. However, as the weeks wore on the public’s support for President Bush’s 
policy began to fade. For six weeks, starting on August 9, a day after President Bush 
announced he was deploying troops to the Persian Gulf, and ending on September 30, 
President Bush Iraq policy approval rating averaged 75.5%.113 The following five weeks, 
starting on October 3, and ending on November 4, President Bush average approval 
rating fell to 63.4%.114 The significant decrease in President Bush’s policy popularity 
might lead to an inference that the American people’s opinion forced President Bush to 
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consider a new policy initiative. However, as shown in the previous sections, President 
Bush had already considered a military option before the poll numbers declined. 
Therefore, the public opinion played little to no role in the securitization move.  
 After the securitization move President Bush failed to recapture the strong support 
his initial deployment enjoyed. Between November 8, and January 13, 1991, President 
Bush’s Iraq approval rating decreased to 59%.115  However, the decrease in approval 
rating did not correlate to a change in policy. Since the policy remained the same despite 
the unpopularity of the preferred policy, a reasonable conclusion can be made that the 
American people were not the intended audience. This conclusion aligns with the content 
of this chapter, as it became increasingly clear that the President’s choice for an audience 
was Congress. The big takeaway from this section is that the American people did not 
have to take on an audience role in order for the securitization move to be successful.  
Conclusion 
 The United States policy of defense and deterrence in the Middle East gave way 
to offensive operations, which intended to punish past and future aggressors. To 
effectively accomplish a shift in posture, President Bush securitized the Iraq issue on 
November 8, 1990, when he announced the deployment of troops for offensive purposes. 
President Bush lacked the authority to unilaterally make this securitizing move, and 
needed support from Congress. Congress is traditionally thought as an intended audience 
of a securitizing move, but the Constitution grants them equal authority to be an actor 
when the issue of war is being considered. However, Congress’s feelings about war in the 
Persian Gulf were not in line with the President’s. To coerce Congress, President Bush 
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tasked his cabinet with a direct messages; Congressional authority for an offensive 
operation was not needed, but the administration expected a yes vote if the President 
asked for Congressional authorization. As this process happened cabinet members shifted 
from advisors to facilitating securitizing actor whose goal was to get an audiences 
approval.  
 Before the securitizing move, the media maintained a role as context builders who 
advocated for the President to do more. After the securitizing move, op-ed pages 
reflected the cabinet’s rhetoric. During this time the Washington Post and New York 
Times pages were strongly biased toward the President and in some instances undercut 
the role of Congress. The media replicated the, us versus them rhetoric of the President 
and passed the responsibility of the forward deployed troops onto Congress. The first 
Gulf War created the context that Iraq was a threat to U.S. national security, and that 
context would heavily influence the Clinton administration.    
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Chapter 4 Clinton Administration 
 
 The Gulf War’s limited nature left Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein in power. 
Additionally, the Gulf War failed to send troops into Iraq, therefore Saddam Hussein 
retained a large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. The Security Council in 
1991, passed UNSCR 687 that created an international inspection team who was tasked 
to eliminate Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) stockpile. The international 
community believed that Iraq’s WMD’s represented an existential threat. Therefore, 
Iraq’s WMD’s were securitized in 1991 and continued to be securitized until the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003.  
 Since the issue of WMD’s were securitized before the Clinton administration, the 
chapter will focus on another issue, the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA). The Iraq Liberation 
Act, signed into law on October 31, 1998, was a securitization move that altered the 
President’s Iraq policy. Congress agreed with the President, the WMD threat was an 
existential threat. However, Congress did not believe that the WMD issue could be 
handled until Saddam Hussein was removed from his official position in Iraq. While 
President Clinton struggled to hold together an international sanction regime, Congress 
held hearings on the possibility of regime change in Iraq. Led by Congressman 
Gillibrand, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which changed the United States 
policy toward Iraq from containment to regime change.  
 The passage of the Iraq Liberation Act emboldened President Clinton’s policy 
toward Iraq. After Operation Desert Fox, the three day bombing campaign that targeted 
Iraq’s WMD sites, President Clinton embraced the idea of regime change. President 
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Clinton’s shift in preferred policy was directly related to the passage of the Iraq 
Liberation Act, and therefore the securitization move can be deemed a success. The 
following sections will give a detailed look into the process of the securitizing move.  
Context 
 The Clinton administration continued the policy of containment in regards to Iraq. 
The continuation of containment necessitated the Clinton administration uphold multiple 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). The resolutions vital to the 
context are UNSCR 687, UNSCR 707, UNSCR 1134, and UNSCR 1137.  
UNSCR 687 was issued in 1991 after U.S. forces liberated Kuwait from the Iraqi 
military.1 Operative clause 8 of UNSCR 687 reads, “Iraq shall unconditionally accept the 
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless under international supervision, of: all 
chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems.”2 
The following clause, operative clause 9, decided the implementation method for 
operative clause 8.3 Iraq was required to submit a letter to the Secretary-General that 
contained the name of all sites in which the material listed in operative clause 8 was 
located, and additionally Iraq had to allow international inspectors to enter their country 
to verify sites.  
UNSCR 707 was issued four months after UNSCR 687, and condemned Iraq for 
not meeting the burden set out in the previous resolution.4 This is the first time in a long 
pattern, in which Iraq withheld required information from the United Nations Special 
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Commission (UNSCOM). This pattern of defiance, started under the Bush administration 
and continued under the Clinton administration was a cause of tension between the 
United States and Iraq.  
UNSCR 1134 and UNSCR 1137 were both released in 1997 and once again 
condemned Iraq’s for failure to comply with UNSCR 687.5 On November 26, 1997, 
President Clinton wrote his quarterly update to Congress concerning Iraq’s compliance 
with UN Security Resolutions.6 In this letter Clinton noted that on October 29, 1997, Iraq 
blocked UNSCOM access to WMD sites, which lead to a month long standoff that was 
resolved on November 20, 1997.7 The resolution lasted a little under two months, when 
Iraq refused to allow inspectors into the country on January 19, 1998. 8 
The pattern of non-compliance undermined confidence in the United Nation’s 
ability to rid Iraq of its WMD. Additionally, WMD’s had been labeled a national security 
threat since 1991, and if Iraq continued to undermine UNSCOM then there was a 
possibility that they would retain their stockpile. For the reasons mentioned above, Iraq’s 
was at the top of America’s 1998 foreign policy docket. As the President continued to 
pursue containment, Congress started to examine a policy orientated on regime change. 
This difference in opinion, along with Iraq’s continued disobedience, led to the 
securitization move: the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. The Iraq Liberation Act 
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transitioned the United States away from a policy of containment and toward a policy 
focused on regime change in Iraq.    
The Cabinet  
 President Clinton’s cabinet committed to weaken and contain Saddam Hussein. 
The maintenance of the status quo policy required the preservation of the international 
sanction regime. On March 29, 1997, the U.S. State Department compiled a memo titled 
“Iraq’s Charm Offensive: USG Response.” 9  The memo coordinated U.S. diplomats’ 
talking points to counter Iraq’s appeal to the international community to lift U.N. 
sanctions. Iraq had succeeded in “charming” Russia and France and the United States 
feared that an international consensus would call for the end of sanctions, despite the fact 
that Iraq failed to meet their obligations under UNSCR 687. 10  Finally, the memo 
emphasized the importance of sanctions. “At a time when we are tightening sanctions 
enforcement on Iraq and seeking to increase Saddam Hussein’s political isolation, we 
need to make it clear to our friends that we consider any movement towards Iraq to be 
counterproductive.”11 This memo reinforced the Clinton administration’s commitment to 
the international sanction regime. 
 An October 1997 report from the Defense Intelligence Assessment, tested 
potential scenarios where the United States military was needed to end a conflict with 
Iraq. “The destruction of Iraqi WMD stockpiles… is an important end state for coalition 
forces. This may necessitate U.S. forces being inspectors, or enforcers of postwar 
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sanctions. A prolonged UN involvement, with U.S. military and logistic support, is 
another possibility.” 12  President Clinton believed the latter proposal was best for 
America, and thus called on the international community to hold Iraq accountable. The 
memo was clear; America’s end goal was the elimination of Saddam’s WMD’s and not 
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.13 With the call for regime change avoided, 
the DIA reaffirmed that the national interest in Iraq was the WMD’s and not the political 
leadership of Iraq. The limited interest in only the capabilities of the Iraqi government 
continued to be the only interest of the Clinton administration until the passage of the 
Iraq Liberation Act in 1998.  
 On February 17, 1998, President Clinton stood in front of the military 
bureaucracy at the Pentagon, and readied the military and the American people for a 
strike on Iraq. The composition of President Clinton’s speech will be assessed later in the 
chapter, but his speech was an important pre-cursor to the CNN town hall that took place 
on February 18.14 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger had to defend President Clinton’s 
threat of a military strike. In her opening statement, Madeleine Albright commented that 
Iraq faced a strict binary choice, comply with UNSCOM or the United States would 
strike potential WMD sites.15 To follow up on Secretary Albright’s statement Secretary 
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Cohen stated that airstrikes would diminish Iraq’s ability to produce WMD’s. 16  The 
cabinet did not advocate for regime change or suggest that a long-term goal involved the 
removal Saddam Hussein.  As I discussed in the introduction, the limited airstrike 
proposal was not a securitization move, because it did not involve securitizing a new 
referent object.  
 By the end of March, the United States influence in the Middle East had 
diminished. On March 20, 1998, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) issued a memo 
titled “U.S. Position Eroding Sharply in the Middle East.” 17  The memo contained 
statements that Arab countries would not accept U.S. military action against Iraq. 
Additionally, these countries expected the U.N. sanctions to be ended. Furthermore, 
France and Russia attempted to undermine sanction efforts in Iraq and led the effort to 
end all U.N. sanctions against Iraq.18 The memo’s impact was limited because on March 
5, the United States came to an agreement with Iraq that prevented any further escalation.  
 Iraq maintained the deal with the U.N. through the summer months. On July 17, 
the NIC put together a report titled “Iraq: Prospect for Confrontation.”19 This memo 
served as a preventive guide. Analysts within the NIC predicted potential flare-ups that 
could lead to conflict between Iraq and the United States. The memo assessed that 
Saddam Hussein would likely pick a fight with UNSCOM– on August 6, this prediction 
came true – in an attempt to undermine the international coalition that maintained the 
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sanctions on Iraq.20 Additionally, this memo concluded that Saddam Hussein lacked the 
ability to attack neighboring countries, Kuwait and Israel. 21  Overall, Saddam Hussein’s 
primary goal was to maintain power and therefore he conducted himself in a rational 
way. 
 In 1997, the President’s cabinet pursued the policy of containment toward Iraq. 
Even with the introduction of a possible military airstrike against WMD sites, the cabinet 
remained consistent, Saddam Hussein did not threaten America’s national security. 
Therefore, the cabinet did not participate in the securitization process.  
Congress 
 In 1998, Republicans controlled both branches of Congress. In the House, 
congressional Republicans planted the seeds for the impeachment of President Clinton. 
Also during this time, Republicans prepared to shift America’s foreign policy toward 
regime change. Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman in the House and Majority Leader 
Trent Lott in the Senate led the charge against President Clinton’s Iraq policy. The 
following section examined three hearings, two in the House and one in the Senate. 
Additionally, two pieces of legislation were reviewed, the 1998 Supplemental 
Appropriation and Recessions Act, and the Iraq Liberation Act. The inaction by President 
toward Iraq, granted the legislative branch an opportunity to become the securitizing 
actor.  
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On February 25, 1998, the House Committee on International Relations held a 
hearing on “U.S. Options In Confronting Iraq.”22 The tone of the hearing was skeptical 
and dreary. Chairman Gilman addressed this tone in his opening remarks.  
The subject of today's hearing is U.S. options in confronting Iraq. When we 
planned this hearing initially, we thought we'd spend most of our time today 
exploring the risks and rewards associated with military action against Iraq, but 
the agreement reached in Iraq two days ago by U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan has changed that equation… Many of us are skeptical of that agreement. 
Saddam Hussein has broken his word to the United Nations many times before. 
Perhaps this time he means to honor his commitments, but we tend to have some 
skepticism about all of that. There are several provisions within the agreement 
that are deeply troubling. It obligates U.N. weapons inspectors to, and I quote, 
"respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty, 
and dignity." That sounds an awful lot like Saddam Hussein's description of what 
the dispute was all about in the first place.23 
 
 As his opening statement continued on Chairman Gilman attacked President 
Clinton’s strategy in Iraq. Before he ceded the floor, Chairman Gilman concluded with a 
question of President Clinton’s resolve toward the ‘true’ problem of Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein. 24  Chairman Gilman’s preferred policy of regime change loomed in the 
background, and was taken up by the witnesses during the hearing.  
 Seated at the witness tables were Richard Haas, Paul Wolfowitz, David Kay, and 
Eliot Cohen. Wolfowitz and Cohen were colleagues at Johns Hopkins SAIS and wrote for 
Project for the New American Century. The Project for the New American Century was a 
think tank heavily influenced by neoconservative foreign policy thinkers. Before 
President Clinton’s 1998 State of the Union, the Project for the New American Century 
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sent President Clinton a letter that urged him to shift his policy on Iraq.25 The letter stated 
President Clinton had a unique opportunity at the State of the Union “to enunciate a new 
strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the 
world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime 
from power.”26 Furthermore, the letter advocated for the President to use military force to 
rid Iraq of its WMD’s.   
David Kay and Richard Haas also supported the policy of regime change. During 
question and answers, David Kay stressed that Saddam Hussein’s removal was the only 
guarantee that Iraq would give up its WMD’s: 
But when you address the question of whether any inspection system can finally 
uproot completely a weapons program in a country as large as Iraq —and most 
times we have only 200 U.N. inspectors in the whole country—if the Iraqi regime 
is determined to protect it, I say, indeed, you cannot hope that inspection, just like 
I do not think you can hope that air power, can do it, and that is why I put such 
great emphasis on a political strategy that is designed not to do business with 
Saddam, but to remove Saddam from power.27 
 
 Kay’s quote, if true, undermined the President’s policy toward Iraq. President 
Clinton hoped to rid Iraq of its WMD’s and then reintegrate Iraq back into the 
international community. If what David Kay says is true, then the Clinton policy of 
sanctions and inspections is like a broken levee: totally ineffective.  
By inviting four witnesses who agreed that the long-term interest of the United 
States was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, Chairman Gillman hoped to 
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prime his congressional colleagues. While some Congressman quibbled about the 
ramifications of military strikes, nobody questioned the policy of regime change. 
Members of Congress missed an opportunity to debate the merits of regime change, and 
another medium for deliberation did not present itself. The idea introduced in February, 
became the United States’ official policy on October 31, 1998, when the President signed 
the Iraq Liberation Act.  
The following week, the Senate’s subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs held a hearing titled “Iraq: Can Saddam be Overthrown.”28 The importance of the 
hearing is minuscule; only two Senators, Senator Brownback and Senator Robb, were in 
attendance. However, Congress, as an institution, openly asked the question if a foreign 
leader could be overthrown. Additionally, similar to the House witnesses, the four 
witnesses held the same long-term policy goal, regime change in Iraq. Even more 
significant was the primary witness, Ahmed Chalabi, spokesman for the Iraqi National 
Congress, better known as the Iraqi government in exile. Congress, as an institution, 
provided a platform for a shadow government, while President Clinton attempted to 
preserve the international inspection regime. At best Congress was showed its 
disapproval for Clinton’s policy and at worse Congress actively tried to undermine the 
negotiations between the United States and Iraq.  
Mr. Chalabi advocated for a stronger and more militaristic policy toward Iraq. Mr. 
Chalabi claimed that the current support for Iraq’s opposition groups were not sufficient, 
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and future aid needed to be made in an overt manner.29 Furthermore, Mr. Chalabi stated 
that the U.S. had to do more with its air power superiority.30 Mr. Chalabi statements were 
given to an empty committee room, but his ideas would find their way into the Iraq 
Liberation Act.  
The second panel contained two members from The Project of the New American 
Century, James Woolsey and Zalmay Khalilzad, and one familiar face, Richard Haas. 
Woolsey claimed that President Clinton’s Iraq policy has been “flaccid and feckless.”31 
Additionally, Woolsey agreed with his Project of the New American Century colleagues 
that if Saddam Hussein violated any future agreement his defiance warranted the use of 
force. Khalilzad echoed Woolsey’s sentiment and added that the opposition forces in Iraq 
needed arms supplied by the United States.32 The recommendation Khalilzad made was 
adopted in the Iraq Liberation Act. Section 4 subsection B reads: “The President is 
authorized to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department 
of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and 
training for such organizations.”33 Despite the lack of Senators present at the hearing, the 
ideas espoused by the witnesses were adopted in the Iraq Liberation Act. These hearings 
acted to build the necessary context that President Clinton’s Iraq strategy lacked the 
necessary means to deal with the issues of WMD’s. Furthermore, as the contents of these 
hearings suggested that a strategy that did not remove Saddam Hussein from power 
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would fail. With an administration that refused to consider regime change, Congress 
needed to become the securitizing actor and force the President to accept the ideas 
espoused in these hearings.  
A precursor to the Iraq Liberation Act was the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations 
and Rescissions act. Included, by Senator Lott of Mississippi, in the appropriation bill 
was section 10008. Section 10008 provided President Clinton with $10 million to “to 
support the democratic opposition and to establish a 'Radio Free Iraq.”34 This move was 
applauded by the Center for Security Policy which ran a headline that read, “Sen. Lott 
Shows How and Secures Means to Topple Saddam.” In addition to securing millions of 
dollars, Senator Lott met with Ahmed Chalabi and called upon President Clinton to do 
the same.35 While I do not consider this allotment of funds to be the securitizing move, it 
set the precedent for the allocation of funds which intended to cause regime change.  
 Over the six-month tenure during Iraq’s compliance with UNSCOM, Congress 
remained quiet on the issue of Iraq. On August 6, one month after Iraq prevented 
UNSCOM inspectors from doing their jobs, the House committee on International 
Relations held a hearing titled “Disarming Iraq: The Status of Weapons Inspections.”36 
This hearing resembled a typical hearing with two guests; Ambassador Indyk, 
represented the administration, and Major William Ritter, a former UNSCOM inspector 
and a critic of the Clinton administration. From the start, Chairman Gilman portrayed 
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Major Ritter as a patriot who quit his job because the Clinton meddled with UNSCOM 
protocols:  
Today, we need to take up the challenge laid down by Mr. Ritter, who resigned 
his post with UNSCOM on August 26 and put his professional career on the line, 
because he realized that this Administration would no longer provide the political 
support and the credible threat of military force to ensure that UNSCOM can 
fulfill its mandate.37  
 
Major Ritter claimed that President Clinton’s lack of resolve, related to airstrikes, 
allowed gave Iraq an incentive to withhold information from UNSCOM. Furthermore, 
Major Ritter claimed that the Clinton administration meddled with UNSCOM inspection 
scheduled, and tried to politicize the process. 38  Chairman Gilman used his opening 
statement to inflate the power of Saddam Hussein. “If we can't summon the will to act 
against Saddam Hussein today, how will we summon the will to do so if and when he 
were to acquire a nuclear and long range missile capability?” 39  Chairman Gilman’s 
statement meets the definition of a speech act. The fear of a nuclear weapons is a 
common trope that has been used since the Cold War to advocate for securitization 
policy. Throughout the two House hearings, Chairman Gilman’s rhetoric was used to 
prime his fellow colleagues to accept his preferred policy preferences.   
There is no evidence that Iraq had become a greater threat to the United States 
because of President Clinton’s policy. Quite the contrary, the DCI issued a classified 
report in 1999, which stated the Iraqi military had been weakened since 1991 and that an 
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Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia was no longer feasible.40 Additionally, a majority of 
Iraq’s WMD stockpile was destroyed by UNSCOM.41 However, Chairman Gilman was 
not concerned with the facts, and his opening statement called upon Congress to change 
the United States policy as it related to Iraq.  
The securitization move happened on September 28, 1998 when Congressman 
Gilman introduced the Iraq Liberation Act. When he introduced the bill Congressman 
Gilman did exactly what Ahmed Chalabi recommended: he was overt about the bill’s 
intention. Mr. Gilman’s statement in the Congressional Record reads: “As the title 
suggests, the purpose of this legislation is to finally and irrevocably commit the United 
States to the removal from power of the regime headed by Saddam Hussein.”42 The 
introduction of the bill and the overt statement was Congressman Gilman attempt to 
signal to the audience, the President, that the Iraq Liberation Act represented a shift in 
U.S. policy toward regime change. Furthermore, Congressman Gilman advocated for a 
future U.S. invasion, “Some suggest that our nation should go to war and rid the 
Persian Gulf of the threat posed by Saddam. We may yet be compelled to do so, but 
before we put American lives at risk in that far away land, we have a duty to explore the 
alternatives (Emphasis Added).”43  
The two above statements and the subsequent vote was the securitization move. 
Chairman Gilman had built a context that policy change was necessary, and then used his 
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political capital to propose a shift in policy. Once Congress voted to pass the Iraq 
Liberation Act, the President had an opportunity, as an audience member, to support or 
reject the securitizing move. When President Clinton signed the bill into law the 
securitization process was complete.  
In 1998 Congress took control of America’s foreign policy, particularly on the 
issue of Iraq. The Washington Post wrote that the Iraq Liberation Act would force the 
President toward war with Iraq. On October 20, 1998, the front page of the Washington 
Post headline read: “Congress Stokes Visions Of War to Oust Saddam; White House 
Fears Fiasco in Aid to Rebels.”44 Congress, was the securitizing actor during the Clinton 
administration, which is contrary to most securitization literature. Since Congress was the 
securitizing actor, the President became the intended audience. Therefore, President 
Clinton, after signing the bill into law, shifted his preferred policy to align it to be in 
compliance with the more hawkish Iraq Liberation Act. The shift in President Clinton’s 
policy was witnessed after Operation Desert Fox and will be explored in detail the next 
section.  
The President  
 President Clinton supported a policy of containment toward Iraq until Congress 
forced the President to shift toward a more hawkish policy in the latter half of the year. 
President Clinton threatened military strikes in the early part of 1998, but that was not a 
securitizing move. Two factors prevent it from being considered a securitization move. 
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First, the threat of WMD’s were already securitized, and Congress had granted the 
President the power to perform airstrike. Therefore, if President Clinton pursued air 
strikes then he would not need the consent of an audience, which removes the issue from 
the securitization process. Second, as the following analysis will show, airstrikes targeted 
WMD sites and not the Iraqi government. The Clinton Administration distinction 
between WMD’s and the Iraqi government meant that no attempt was made to securitize 
the Iraq regime. If the goal of the air strikes were to create a vacuum in Iraq or led to 
regime change then the air strikes would have represented a securitization move. 
Therefore, Clinton was an audience member that became the securitization actor after 
Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act. 
 According to the public papers of the President, in 1998, President Clinton 
publicly addressed the question of Iraq eighty-five times. In his first appearance in 1998, 
President Clinton correctly claimed that the Iraqi military was significantly weaker than 
they were in the past.45  During his interview with Jim Lehrer of PBS news, President 
Clinton stated, “My concern is not to re-fight the Gulf War; my concern is to prepare 
our people for a new century, not only in positive ways like creating a big international 
financial framework that works for them, as that we just talked about, but also to make 
sure we have the tools to protect ourselves against chemical and biological weapons 
(Emphasis Added).”46 The phrase “my concern is not to re-fight the Gulf war” is a 
reference to a Senator Lott, a hawkish Republican. Senator Lott had previously suggested 
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that regime change was the only viable option to deal with Iraq. This was a commonly 
held view among Republicans in Congress. President Clinton statement that there would 
not be another second gulf war, is supported by his attempt to contain and not inflame 
Iraq. President Clinton did not consider regime change as a viable option.  
 In the same interview President Clinton claimed that the United States, as the 
world’s only superpower, had a moral responsibility to show restraint.47 Clinton’s claim 
that America had an imperative toward peace, was an attempt to avoid escalation because 
he knew a military strike would end UNSCOM inspections. UNSCOM inspections were 
vital to President Clinton’s policy of containment and therefore an airstrike would likely 
force him to rethink his preferred policy.  
 In February, tensions continued to rise, as airstrikes against Iraq became a serious 
possibility. A reporter asked President Clinton, “Mr. President there are a lot of 
Republican leaders and armchair generals who want to change your policy toward Iraq 
and to take out Saddam. What is your feeling about that now?”48  President Clinton 
rejected the idea of the United States sponsored regime change. “Would the Iraqi people 
be better off if there were a change in leadership? I certainly think they would be. But 
that is not what the United Nations has authorized us to do; that is not what our 
immediate interest is about.”49 The statement showcased President Clinton’s attempt to 
maintain a limited U.S. interest in the region. The limited interest was the removal of 
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WMD’s from Iraq, and his statement suggested that was the only policy the United States 
was set to pursue. 
 As noted earlier in the chapter, President Clinton addressed the Pentagon on 
February 17, 1998. The tone of the speech was more militaristic than previous statements, 
as President Clinton casted Saddam as a threat against his own people, regional security, 
and the international order.50 Even with the inflation of the Saddam threat, President 
Clinton remained vigilant that the airstrikes goal were to destroy Saddam’s WMD 
stockpile and nothing else. “If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our 
purpose is clear: We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction program. We want to seriously reduce his capacity to threaten his 
neighbors.” 51  Furthermore, President Clinton offered Saddam a way out, “Saddam 
Hussein could end this crisis tomorrow, simply by letting the weapons inspectors 
complete their mission. He made a solemn commitment to the international community to 
do that and to give up his weapons of mass destruction a long time ago, now.”52 President 
Clinton’s speech had a dual-purpose, he wanted to send a message of strength to the 
American public, American forces, and the international community. Additionally, he 
appealed to Saddam Hussein that diplomacy was still an option. President Clinton’s 
policy preferences differed from his Republican colleagues, and therefore he remained 
committed to sanctions and inspections.  
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 The U.N. and Iraq came to an agreement, which in turn prevented an U.S. 
airstrike. After the deal, President Clinton rarely mentioned Iraq in his public 
appearances. On June 24, in his letter to Congressional leaders on Iraq’s compliance with 
United Nations Security Resolution, President Clinton admitted that Iraq was in 
compliance with UNSCOM but Iraq had not met its responsibilities related to UNSCR 
687.53 Additionally, President Clinton mentioned the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations 
and Rescissions Act. The signing statement did not mention the appropriation for Iraqi 
opposition group, but President Clinton used his letter to Congress to pay lip service to 
the measure.   
On May 1, I signed into law the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and 
Rescissions Act. This legislation provides funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty to initiate a surrogate broadcast service for the Iraqi people. It also 
provides funding for efforts to support the democratic Iraqi opposition in 
presenting a credible alternative to the present Iraqi regime and compiling 
information to support the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes. These new 
programs will enable us to redouble our work with the Iraqi opposition to support 
their efforts to build a pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule 
of law and respects basic human rights.54    
 
 I refer to this statement as Clinton paying lip service to Congress because no 
public statement was made in support of Congress’s policy of regime change. If President 
Clinton had announced this policy during a press conference then it could be interpreted 
as an acceptance of Congresses policy. Furthermore, it was an improper time to announce 
a change in U.S. policy. As President Clinton noted in his report, Iraq was complying 
with the UNSCOM and to openly flaunt the United States was pursing regime change in 
Iraq would have undermined the relative success. This is not a one off occurrence, when 
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President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act his statement did not portray the 
Chairman Gilman desire for regime change.  
 After he signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law, President Clinton stated that this 
act was how Congress perceived the problem. “This Act makes clear that it is the sense 
of the Congress that the United States should support those elements of the Iraqi 
opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter reality of internal 
repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers 
(Emphasis added).”55 Throughout the statement President Clinton continually suggested 
that the main objective for the United States was the workability of UNSCOM 
inspections.56 Ironically, the Iraq Liberation Act, undermined UNSCOM. On October 31, 
the same day President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law, Iraq announced 
that it would not allow UNSCOM inspectors into their country. 57  America had just 
adopted a measure to directly fund his opposition, and therefore Saddam had no incentive 
to allow inspectors back into his country. While there is no publicly available information 
to confirm that the Iraq Liberation Act led Saddam to block inspectors from entering the 
country, it is a well-reasoned inference.  
 Saddam’s defiance led President Clinton to launch airstrike against Iraq on 
December 16. Referred to as Operation Desert Fox, the stated purpose of the strikes were 
to cripple Saddam’s ability to create and disperse WMD’s. The strikes were consistent 
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with President Clinton’s objectives stated in his February Pentagon speech. However, 
during his address to the American people President Clinton endorsed the idea of regime 
change in Iraq.  
The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well 
being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best 
way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi Government, a 
Government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a Government that respects 
the rights of its people. Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We 
will strengthen our engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and 
work with them effectively and prudently.58 
 
 This was the first time President Clinton publicly advocated for regime change in 
Iraq. As mentioned in the Congress section, President Clinton the audience in the 
securitization move. President Clinton’s signature was the required audience approval of 
the securitizing move. After he signed the bill into law, President Clinton then became 
the securitization actor. The Iraq Liberation Act granted the President plenary power on 
deciding which resistance groups to back. Section 5 (a) of the Iraq Liberation Act reads, 
“Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
designate one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that the President 
determines satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance 
under section 4.”59  The Iraq Liberation Act provided President Clinton with additional 
resources, and therefore he assumed the role of a securitization actor. 
The Media 
 To judge the role the media played in the securitization process I viewed the op-
ed pages of the Washington Post and The New York Times one month before the signing 
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of the Iraq Liberation Act and one week after the act was signed into law. Therefore, the 
timeframe for the selections were between September 24, and November 7. The 
Washington Post and the New York Times each had nine total selections during this time 
period. Out of the nine selections each had one that was not relevant to the scope of this 
paper. For each article I rated the tone negative, neutral, or positive. To receive a positive 
rating the article had to advocate for or accept President Clinton’s policy. A neutral rating 
was given if the article did not advocate or criticize President Clinton’s policy. Finally, a 
negative rating was given if the article was critical of President Clinton’s policy. Out of 
the eight Washington Post selections, five were negative, two were neutral, and one was 
positive. The New York Times articles were more critical, all eight selections were 
negative. The New York Times number, however, is skewed because the op-ed page had 
only two authors writing about Iraq during this time. Both authors were critical of 
President Clinton and their articles contributed to the context surrounding the 
securitization move.  
Washington Post 
 The two articles that were rated neutral were critical of U.S. military power in 
Iraq. Both pieces, “Dwindling Ranks” and “Envisioning War”60 argued that the military 
was overstretched, and the resources necessary to fight a war were not available. In 
“Dwindling Ranks” Patrick Paxton noted that the United States lacked the resources to 
deploy the naval and air forces units necessary to launch an attack against Saddam’s 
WMD sites.61 “Envisioning War” took an international relations approach to an attack on 
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Iraq. This op-ed was a response to the Washington Post “Congress Stokes Visions of 
War” piece which was cited earlier in this chapter. This piece questioned U.S. strategic 
interest in the region, how a strike that targeted Saddam would work, and who would fill 
the vacuum when Saddam was ousted.62 This article was critical of Congresses hawkish 
nature, but did not take a stance on President Clinton’s policy.  
 The one positive article came from the Ranking Democrat on the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Joe Biden. This article is marked as positive but, it should 
be noted that Iraq is mentioned tangentially in the article. Senator Biden’s article is titled 
“Our Money Could Talk at the U.N.” and argued for Congressional Republicans to fund 
the U.N. In the article Biden mentioned that U.S. dollars go directly to UNSCOM 
inspectors and the current policy had succeeded in containing Iraq.63 The dedication of 
one sentence related to Iraq does not seem like much, however it was a tacit approval of 
President Clinton’s policy in Iraq. Notwithstanding the op-ed, Senator Biden did not 
object to the Iraq Liberation Act.  
 The five negative articles used strong language and were beyond critical of 
President Clinton’s policy in Iraq. Michael Kelly in his piece “No Stopping Saddam” 
labeled Clinton’s policy toward Iraq appeasement.64 George F. Will in his piece “Ersatz 
Seriousness About Serbia” stated that Saddam controlled Clinton like a yo-yo. According 
to George Will, Saddam pulled Clinton’s string however he saw fit.65 In Jim Hoagland 
piece he quoted U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan who said, “The will isn’t there for 
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the U.S. to live up to its agreement.”66 That was a damning statement, as Kofi Annan 
oversaw the UNSCOM inspections. The elites were critical of President Clinton’s policy 
toward Iraq and provided a context that action needed to be taken.  
 Jim Hoagland’s article on November 5, provided an insight into the role of the 
media as a securitizing actor. Hoagland’s article titled “Saddam’s Endless War” repeated 
the failures of President Clinton’s Iraq policy.67 At the end of his piece Jim Hoagland 
advocated for the President to use the Iraq Liberation Act to supply Iraqi rebels with 
arms. According to Hoagland “The immediate military impact of weapons supplies to the 
opposition would be very limited in the best of circumstances. The importance of the act 
lies in the political signal that using it would send.”68 The final sentence of the article 
echoed the sentiment of David Kay’s statement in front of Congress, with Saddam in 
power there will never be peace in Iraq and the United States would never been able to 
rid Iraq of its WMD’s.   
 
 
New York Times 
 William Safire and A.M. Rosenthal represent the two op-ed columnists for the 
New York Times that wrote on Iraq. The content of the articles does not differ from the 
Washington Post’s content, as Rosenthal and Safire used colorful language that barraged 
Clinton’s Iraq policy. In William Safire’s article “Dealing with Dictators” he took a 
hardline that Congress had not done enough in passing the Iraq Liberation Act.  
                                                        
66 Jim Hoagland, “Bluster and Blink”, Washington Post, October 22 1998, “LexisNexis Academic”. 
67 Jim Hoagland, “Saddam’s Endless War”, Washington Post, November 5 1998, “LexisNexis Academic”. 
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Our hawks say: Since we're not about to use our military power against Saddam, 
at least let's try something in the overthrow line. He is said to have stomach 
cancer, and his generals may not want to wait around. Clinton aggressive 
multilateralists say: As long as we're not committing our own forces, we'll give it 
a cushion shot. But don't blame us for a Bay of Pigs. Does this make sense? In the 
presence of a threat of mass destruction, and in the absence of a command 
decision to remove that threat, a half-measure of trying to foment an indigenous 
coup is better than no measure at all.69 
 
 Both the Washington Post and the New York Times served an important role in 
the context that surrounded the Iraq threat. This context justified Congress’s action.  
The American Public 
 The American public remained uninterested with President Clinton’s Iraq policy. 
Over the span of one year 19 polls were conducted by various organizations that asked 
the American public whether they approved or disapproved of President Clinton’s 
handling of Iraq.70 The first poll of the year, conducted by ABC between the dates of 
January 15, and January 19, showed that 53% of the American people supported 
Clinton’s policy while 39% disapproved of his policy. 71  According to an ABC poll 
conducted on January 28, and January 29, in two weeks, President Clinton gained 18 
percentage approval points which gave him a total of 71% approval compared to a 19% 
disapproval rating,.72  
                                                        
69 William Safire, “Dealing With Dictators”, New York Times, October 22 1998, “LexisNexis Academic” 
70 These polls come from the Roper Center Database 
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 President Clinton averaged a 65% approval rating and a 24% disapproval rating 
for his Iraq policy. One telling statistic is there are no polls conducted during August, 
September, or October, the months where Congress created the context necessary to 
securitize the issue. Furthermore, the Iraq issue did not factor into the 1998 midterm 
election, as Democrats did not lose any Senate seats and picked up 5 seats in the House of 
Representatives. Overall, the American public did not play a role in the securitization of 
the Iraq issue. Likely the issue of Iraq was not salient to the American public and the lack 
of a push from the President kept the issue salient only among the elites in Washington 
D.C. 
Conclusion 
 The year of 1998 saw tensions flare within the halls of Washington D.C. where 
Congress thought the Clinton administration policy toward Iraq was flawed. As Iraq 
continued to defy U.N. Security Council Resolutions President Clinton began the process 
of planning military strikes against Iraq WMD sites. According to Congress these plans 
were inadequate because it did not address the root cause of the problem, Saddam 
Hussein. Congress began a yearlong process that started with the hearings in both the 
House and the Senate, to securitize the Iraq issue. By successfully securitizing the issue, 
through the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, Congress was the securitizing actor.  The 
audience, the President and the President’s cabinet, took the action passed by Congress 
and adopted a formal policy of regime change therefore becoming securitizing actors 
after the fact. The media worked to build a context that highlighted that a change in 
policy was necessary and then after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act became actors 
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in offering policy changes that were made possible via the bill’s passage. Finally, the 
American people did not play any role in the securitization of the issue and were 
generally positive about President Clinton’s policy toward Iraq.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
 The United States policy toward Iraq, over two administrations, was muddled and 
incoherent. This was expected because the United States lacked a formal threat 
identification process. Without a formal process the securitizing actor manipulated the 
context and inflated the Iraqi threat, which consequently led to ad-hoc decisions. 
Additionally, a threat identification process is a means to purse an end of grand strategy. 
Without a threat identification process, attempts at grand strategy are destined to fail.  
The following sections contain major takeaways for the five variables and what 
impact, if any, the research conducted in this thesis can have on future scholarly works. I 
conclude with recommendations that can address the current ad-hoc threat identification 
process.   
Recommendations for Scholars 
The findings of this thesis can be used as a guide on what to look for in future 
studies. The first finding is that more research is needed on how a policy is made. A 
recent article by John Glaser, “Truth, Power, and the Academy: A Response to Hal 
Brands” stressed that there is a gap between scholarly work and implemented policy.1 
Why is there a gap between academic policy recommendations and policies 
implemented? One hypothesis is that current research fails to ask the question of how 
policy is implemented, instead focusing on why a policy is implemented. Not to undercut 
scholars who develop theories on why a problem or risk arises, but for the academy’s 
                                                        
1 John Glaser, “Truth, Power and the Academy: A Response to Hal Brands,” War on the Rocks, March 26, 
2018 <https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/truth-power-and-the-academy-a-response-to-hal-brands/>. 
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work to be adopted at a national level more research is needed on the how question. Only 
after scholars develop a notion of how the threat evaluation policy process works, can 
they then recommend institutional changes.  
The second finding is that when conducting research on securitization a 
comprehensive approach is more valuable than a siloed approach. A siloed approach 
focuses on one variable, independent of the additional national security variables. Taking 
a siloed approach can lead to a distortion of the securitization move, and the 
misidentification of the variable’s proper role. If you were tasked with putting together a 
1,000-piece puzzle, you wouldn’t claim that you had completed the puzzle after putting 
50 pieces together. Similar to putting together a puzzle, this thesis has displayed the 
interactive nature of the national security variables and therefore a more comprehensive 
approach is necessary to understand how a threat becomes a threat.  
In the introduction, I claimed that the lack of a threat identification process led to 
ad-hoc decisions and risk inflation. One factor that facilitated risk inflation was the 
failure of the intelligence community. In Chapter 3’s cabinet section I highlighted the 
intelligence community failure to predict Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Thereafter, the 
intelligence community compensated for its failure, by inflating the risk of an Iraq. 
Despite the lack of evidence to support an aggressive Iraq, the intelligence community 
claimed that Iraq was going to invade Saudi Arabia. This prediction never came true but 
it was not labeled as an intelligence failure. When an institution is punished when it fails 
to predict an outcome, but is not penalized for incorrectly inflating a risk, there is an 
intrinsic incentive for risk inflation. Therefore, the current system does not incentivize a 
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rational approach to a potential threat, and until the ad-hoc process is replaced analyst 
will be encouraged to inflate a threat.  
Additionally, Chapter 4’s securitization move was made in an ad-hoc manner; 
Congress fed up with the President’s lack of action did not discuss the ramifications of 
the Iraq Liberation Act. Congress linked the risk of WMD’s with the Saddam Hussein 
regime, which subsequently led to inflation of the Iraqi threat. By interlocking the WMD 
threat with Saddam Hussein, Congress told the President that only regime change could 
lead to a WMD free Iraq. The lack of Congressional debate about regime change and its 
subsequent effects was a sign that the securitization move was made in an ad-hoc 
manner.  
The lack of a formal policy procedure generated an environment ripe for threat 
inflation. Consequently, an environment defined by risk inflation leads to any analysis 
that is not in line with the risk inflation to be disregarded.2  Future research needs to 
investigate securitizing moves with the intent of further developing the ad-hoc nature of 
policy decisions. 
Cabinet Findings 
 The two case studies revealed that the cabinet could play one of two roles, an 
advisory or a complimentary facilitating actor role. These two roles are dependent on the 
President and whether the President embraced the role of an actor or was the intended 
audience. In Chapter 3, the cabinet played the role of a facilitating actor in response to the 
President’s securitization move and adopted the President’s rhetoric in testimony before 
Congress. Contrary to the cabinet’s role during the Bush Administration, Clinton’s 
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cabinet served an advisory role. From the documents reviewed, the Clinton cabinet did 
not possess strong feelings about U.S. policy toward Iraq, and those views likely reflected 
President Clinton’s views at the time. It is fair to assume that in most instances the 
cabinet will align with the President’s views on a security issue and therefore 
identification of the President’s role in the securitization move will likely be related to the 
cabinet’s role.   
The President 
Discussions related to foreign policy tend to focus on the President. However, as 
Chapter 4 showed, the President is not always the securitizing actor, rather (s)he can 
serve as the intended audience. This finding is important to future scholarship for two 
reasons. First, future scholars should not assume the President is the securitizing actor. 
Holger Stritzel warned researchers that predetermining the securitization actor led to the 
misconstruction of the securitization move.3 As Stritzel’s case study on organized crime 
showed, Congress performed the securitizing move before the politician, in that case 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, announced that organized crime was an existential 
threat.4 Furthermore, future scholarship should consider the ramifications of the President 
as an audience member. As mentioned in Chapter 4, after the President approved of the 
securitizing move, he became the actor in charge of the securitizing move. The President 
had to implement the policy of another securitizing actor. This odd dynamic needs to be 
studied further to understand the fluidity between the role of an actor and audience.  
                                                        
3 Holger Stitzel, “Securitization, Power, Intertextuality: Discourse Theory and the Translations of 
Organized Crime,” Security Dialouge 43 no. 6 (2012) p. 553 
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 In Chapter 3, the President served in a more traditional role as a securitizing actor. 
President Bush made the decision to use force against Iraq, and then used his political 
capital to coerce Congress’s approval. Further scholars can compare President Bush’s 
treatment of Congress to past President’s treatment of Congress. Previously, Congress 
had tried to take back the power of being a co-equal partner on matters dealing with 
foreign affairs, with the most prominent example being the War’s Power Resolution, 
however past changes have failed to live up to expectation. Scholars need to develop 
institutional changes that would allow for Congress to regain its Constitutional place as a 
co-equal actor, which in turn should prevent Congress from being coerced.  
Congress 
 Congress can either play a robust role or be mitigated to agreeing with the 
President on matters related to foreign policy. In Chapter 3, Congress’s institutional 
design as a body of long and slow deliberation, allowed for the President to use an 
accelerated timeline to diminish Congress’s role as an actor. Conversely, in Chapter 4, 
Congress radically altered the United States policy toward Iraq, with little deliberation or 
debate. To solve for the former problem, Congress would be wise to accept institutional 
changes recommended by future scholars. A balance between the executive and 
legislative branches would lead to a debate on the United States interests abroad. 
 As Congress becomes more engaged in policy process it should be wary not to 
adopt the strategies seen in Chapter 4. During the Clinton administration, Congress held 
sham hearings, with no intellectual diversity, and forced the Clinton administration to 
accept a policy of regime change. Similar to how President Bush coerced Congress in 
Chapter 3, Congress compelled President Clinton to accept its securitization move in 
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Chapter 4. This is a common theme displayed through the two case studies and 
something that needs to be considered further.  
 
The Media 
 In both case studies the media sided with the securitizing actor and formed a 
context around the securitizing move. Often referred to as the fourth estate, the function 
of the media is to present unbiased information to the American electorate and to check 
government overreach. However, through the case studies, it becomes evident that op-ed 
pages generally agree with the securitizing move. This phenomenon is not contained to 
the securitization of Iraq. Today, the media continues to advocate for securitizing moves. 
Robert Wright, a visiting professor of science and religion at Union Theological 
Seminary in New York, wrote an article for The Intercept titled “How the New York 
Times is Making War with Iran More Likely.”5 Mr. Wright wrote that the media lacked 
cognitive empathy, which he defined as “the ability to understand how others process 
information and see the world.” 6  For Wright, a cognitive empathy approach would 
interpret Iran’s foreign policy moves through the lens of Iranian national interest. 
However, the New York Times and Washington Post commonly interpret a state’s 
intention through a U.S. centric lens, which  leads to a zero-sum game analysis. Rather 
than viewing Iran’s moves in the Middle East as an attempt to secure the stability of their 
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neighboring countries, the New York Times frames the issue as Iran trying to expand its 
regional influence.7  
During the 1990’s the Washington Post and New York Times op-ed pages lacked 
cognitive empathy. One possible explanation is that op-eds in general do not portray 
cognitive empathy because a writer is attempting to persuade an audience. However, the 
lack of opinion diversity does not allow the audience, policy makers and/or American 
citizen, to grasp alternative policy options. Therefore, the op-ed page becomes a 
reinforcement mechanism for the securitizing move. This practice does not have to 
continue, op-ed pages can adopt viewpoint diversity, as the Washington Post did during 
operation Desert Shield. Viewpoint diversity is not a silver bullet, but it will act as tool to 
reduce the media’s bias toward the securitization actor move.  
The American People 
 The American People failed to impact the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The lack of 
impact is concerning, because the American people function as a check on the 
securitizing actor. If the American people remain unengaged, the securitizing actor does 
not have to fear blowback from the American people. Introduction of formal guidelines 
on how a state becomes a threat could increase the engagement of the American people 
because it would offer an avenue for the American people to voice their opinion on 
whether the securitizing actor followed the guidelines. Also, future studies can examine 
the role of the American people in ending a securitization move. When the securitization 
move involves war, the American people can play a significant role as an actor to end the 
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securitizing moment. The Vietnam protest is an example of how the American people 
used its influence to alter the securitizing actors preferred policy.  
Recommendations for Institutional Changes 
 If the United States wants to pursue a grand strategy that is coherent, a proper way 
to identify threat needs to be developed. My first recommendation is there needs to be a 
clear definition of what constitutes the national interest. In the introduction, I noted that 
the NSS is written vaguely allowing policymakers to create a causal link between any 
security threat and the national interest. A vague national interest allows for a securitizing 
actor to inflate the risk that a country poses to the United States. Therefore, defining what 
the United States national interest is, will allow for a grand strategy that is narrow and 
tailored to the threats against America. Formal documents, such as the NSS, should be 
written as an institutional guideline that dictates the United States national interest.  
 Once the United States defines what constitutes the national interest then current 
threats need to be reevaluated. This reevaluation will force policymakers to rethink the 
previously identified threats through the lens of a defined national interest. This process 
will force policymakers to link the national interest with the identified threat, which then 
can be assessed by colleagues to determine whether the justification is valid.  
 Finally, Congress should mandate, by law, that policymakers undertake a rational 
cost-benefit risk assessment before securitizing a threat. If Congress is the securitizing 
actor then the assessment must be made available to all members before a roll call vote. 
These assessments can model the work of international relation scholars, or better yet can 
be contracted out to scholars who can present an unbiased analysis of the securitized 
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issue.8  Forcing policymakers to conduct a cost-benefit risk assessment can stop risk 
inflation in two ways. First, it forces the decision maker to confront the risk that is being 
securitized. A formal test will reveal any bias toward risk inflation, and at the very least 
force a policy maker to justify their threat assessment. Second it provides the audience 
with a guideline with how the threat was originally assessed. The audience can then view 
the assessment critically and make a decision on whether the threat deserves to be 
securitized. 
 As more comprehensive scholarly work is conducted future recommendations can 
be made to address the reoccurring trends. Updating the War Power Resolution, 
restricting the cabinet’s political influence, and constructing avenues to get the America 
people involved, are all possible institutional solutions that future scholars can examine. 
According to Henry Kissinger, the United States unipolar moment is over and is being 
replaced with a multilateral international system. 9  Therefore, in the coming decades 
America will face new challenges possibly from multiple states and non-state actors. To 
deal with these challenges, the United States needs a coherent grand strategy, which is 
dependent on a threat identification process.  
   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 For an example of risk assessment see: John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Responsible 
Counterterrorism Policy,” Cato Institute no. 755, September 10, 2014 
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9 Henry Kissinger, World Order, (New York: Penguin Books, 2014) P. 2.  
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